Ilzam as dialectical refutation in Islamic thought: Aristotelian origins and the argumentum ex concessis tradition

Iftekhar Ahmed, Ahmadiyya Archive and Research Centre

I. Introduction

The concept of ilzam, often employed by the Promised Messiah, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad^as (d. 1326/1908), represents a significant aspect of his argumentative strategy, especially when engaging with opponents in both direct debates and theoretical discussions. This concept, represented by the Arabic term ilzam – which gave rise to the Urdu expression ilzami jawab commonly used in the Indian subcontinent – has unfortunately been subject to misinterpretation and controversy, leading some critics to erroneously accuse the Promised Messiah^as of blasphemy.

Moreover, the Urdu expression ilzami jawab has often been mistranslated as “accusatory response,” a misconstruction that is not only inaccurate but also misleading, as it suggests a focus on personal attacks rather than logical argumentation. To understand the true meaning of ilzam, we must turn to its Arabic roots. The term derives from the verb alzama, meaning “to compel” or “to obligate.”

This concept is known in the Western logical tradition as argument from commitment (argumentum ex concessis). Unlike, for instance, the ad hominem fallacy, which attacks the person making the argument, argumentum ex concessis, when properly employed, is a valid form of argumentation with a long and distinguished history. It seeks to reveal inconsistencies within an opponent’s position by utilising their own statements and beliefs as premises, targeting the logical coherence of their stance, not their character.

This paper aims to clarify the true meaning and significance of ilzam, situating its usage within the broader context of Islamic intellectual history and demonstrating its connection to established principles of theological debate. The paper will begin by exploring the historical and philosophical underpinnings of ilzam, particularly its relationship to the Western concept of argumentum ex concessis. It will then examine the application of ilzam within Islamic scholarship, drawing on a wide range of sources to establish its legitimacy as a tool of theological discourse. Finally, the paper will discuss the Promised Messiah’s^as views on, and justifications for, the use of ilzam, demonstrating that his approach to this technique was consistent with established Islamic scholarly traditions and refuting the accusations of blasphemy.

II. Philosophical and historical roots of argumentum ex concessis

The practice of employing an opponent’s concessions to reveal inconsistencies within their own position has a long history in Western philosophical thought. This technique, known as argumentum ex concessis, forms the basis of the approach we are discussing here.

II. A. Illustrating argumentum ex concessis: A simple example

To illuminate the concept of argumentum ex concessis, let us consider a simple, everyday example:

“Here is a very simple example. There will be eleven people for lunch. The maid exclaims, ‘That’s bad luck!’ Her mistress is in a hurry, and replies, ‘No, Mary, you’re wrong; it’s thirteen that brings bad luck.’ The argument is unanswerable and puts an immediate end to the dialogue.” (Chaim Perelman; L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, p. 111)

This short dialogue neatly demonstrates the principle of argumentum ex concessis in action. The maid, by expressing her belief in the bad luck associated with the number eleven, inadvertently concedes to a broader premise: that numbers can influence fortune. The mistress strategically utilises this implicit concession to counter the maid’s specific claim, redirecting the focus to a different number, thirteen, without necessarily endorsing the underlying belief in numerology.

The effectiveness of the mistress’ argument hinges entirely on the maid’s acceptance of the initial premise – that certain numbers are inherently unlucky. If the maid does not genuinely hold this belief, the argument loses its persuasive power. This example illustrates the key mechanism of argumentum ex concessis: leveraging an opponent’s pre-existing beliefs or concessions to support a different, often unintended, conclusion.

II. B. Formal dialectical systems and counterfactual conditionals

In formal dialectical systems, commitment to a proposition and its logical progression are central. The proponent’s role is to defend their thesis using premises that the opponent has already accepted, while both participants strive to maintain consistency in their positions. Should the opponent’s commitments logically support the proponent’s thesis, the opponent is obligated to either accept the conclusion or revise their prior commitments. Likewise, if a contradiction emerges between the proponent’s thesis and their original premises, they must adjust their stance accordingly. This approach requires the opponent to confront the logical implications of their own assertions, highlighting inconsistencies without introducing external assumptions. This method not only exposes logical flaws but also challenges informal fallacies, such as the straw man fallacy, where incorrect or exaggerated positions are attributed to the opponent.

From a formal perspective, an ex concessis argument is structured to establish a counterfactual conditional, where the antecedent includes the premises and the consequent is the argument’s conclusion. This method hinges on the proponent demonstrating that the opponent’s commitment logically extends to the new conclusion. If this inference fails, the argument collapses. Within dialectical exchanges, this technique pressures the opponent to uphold consistency, revealing contradictions that force them to either accept the conclusion or revise their stance. While inherently sound, this approach may be misused if the proponent exaggerates or distorts the opponent’s position.

II. C. Further distinctions within argumentum ex concessis

In Western logic, what is called an argument from commitment rests on the premise that if someone (“a”) is committed to a proposition (“A”) – either generally or based on their previous statements – then they are logically bound to support “A.” This type of argument aims to expose any inconsistencies between a person’s past statements and their current stance.

Argumentum ex concessis specifically refers to a style of argumentation tailored to an opponent’s particular claims. Here, one party may cite a statement made by the opponent, either to refute it directly or to highlight contradictions with other of the opponent’s assertions. This approach demonstrates inconsistency and serves to undermine the credibility of the opponent’s overall position.

Another relevant scenario involves using an opponent’s views to argue for one’s own position. In this case, a person leverages premises they do not necessarily endorse but which they assume the opponent finds convincing. For example, even without believing in spiritualism or vegetarianism oneself, one might employ principles from these doctrines when debating an adherent of one of these beliefs.

II. D. Early examples of argumentum ex concessis

Socrates (d. 399 BCE) used a questioning method known as elenchus to expose contradictions in his interlocutors’ beliefs. Through carefully guided questions, he led them to conclusions that conflicted with their accepted premises, not to impose a particular viewpoint but to encourage deeper reflection on their beliefs.

A similar approach appears in the work of Zeno of Elea (c. 430 BCE), a student of Parmenides (d. ca. 460/455 BCE), who defended Parmenides’ philosophy, notably his denial of motion. Zeno’s hypothetical arguments illustrated how accepting the concept of motion led to contradictions and absurdities. For instance, Zeno argued that if “the things that are” are indeed many, they must simultaneously be both like and unlike – an impossible outcome: “For neither can unlike things be like, nor like things unlike.” (Plato, Parmenides, 127e).

Though Zeno’s arguments may not have reflected his personal views on reality, his purpose was strategic: he sought to challenge the underlying assumptions of Parmenides’ opponents by revealing the inherent contradictions within them. Zeno’s dialectical refutations likely focused solely on exposing these contradictions, without delving into descriptions of the world beyond what aligned with Parmenides’ philosophy.

II. E. Aristotle: Formalising dialectic

Aristotle (d. 322 BCE), recognising Zeno as a pioneer of dialectic, formalised this argumentative technique. Aristotle’s dialectic, as elaborated in his Topics, involves arguing from commonly held beliefs to expose their inadequacy or falsehood. This method, distinct from his demonstrative logic, relies on the opponent’s own premises, not on empirically proven facts. This method of argumentation, deeply rooted in dialectical reasoning, involves revealing contradictions within an opponent’s position by employing their own accepted premises:

“It is in like manner necessary also when the questioner, having reached a certain point through induction by means of the view which his opponent has set forth, then attempts to demolish that point; for, if this has been demolished, the view originally set forth is also demolished.” (Aristotle, Topics, 112a)

He also advocates for a strategic, even indirect approach when constructing a refutation:

“Next, do not put forward the thing you actually need to obtain, but rather something which this follows of necessity. For people more readily agree because it is not equally evident what is going to follow from this, and when the latter has been obtained, the former has also.” (Ibid., 156b)

In his Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle underscores the importance of identifying contradictions:

“Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise also in refutations, you ought to look for contradictions between the answerer’s views and either his own statements or the views of those who are generally held to bear a like character and to resemble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind.” (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 174b19-23)

Aristotle’s focus on inconsistencies between statements and actions in this quote reflects the ancient Greek emphasis on living virtuously. In this tradition, a philosopher’s personal conduct is relevant to evaluating their ideas since philosophies aim to guide good living. Therefore, discrepancies between a philosopher’s principles and practices legitimately challenge their arguments, as seen in Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In contrast, modern philosophy’s more scientific approach often separates a thinker’s personal life from the evaluation of their theories. However, in ethical theories designed to guide behaviour, the justification is still tied to the proponent’s actions, especially within a virtue ethics framework. Thus, assessing ex concessis arguments remains linked to Aristotelian virtue ethics.

He further refines this approach in Prior Analytics, stating that if an opponent concedes a proposition that logically leads to a conclusion contradicting their stance, a refutation is inevitable:

“Hence if the admitted proposition is contrary to the conclusion, refutation must result, since refutation is a syllogism which proves the contradictory conclusion.” (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 66b11)

Aristotle reiterates this approach in his Rhetoric, where he advises refuting an opponent by finding discrepancies between them and their statements:

“Another line is to refute our opponent’s case by noting any disagreements: first, in the case of our opponent if there is any disagreement among all his dates, actions, and statements.” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1400a15)

The strategic use of an opponent’s concessions also appears in Metaphysics, where Aristotle differentiates between proof and refutation:

“I mean ‘proving by way of refutation’ to differ from ‘proving’ in that, in proving, one might seem to beg the question, but where someone else is responsible for this, there will be a refutation, not a proof.” (Metaphysics, 1006b15-18)

Furthermore, Aristotle acknowledges that some arguments may be refuted not by direct evidence but by illustrating contradictions within an opponent’s stance:

“About such matters there is no absolute proof, though there is proof ad hominem.” (Metaphysics, 1062a2-3)

Aristotle in his above discussion of the principle of non-contradiction distinguishes “absolute proof” (haplos apodeixis) from “proof ad hominem” (Greek pros ton de apodeixis), i.e., proof relative to this person.

In Western thought, to argue ad hominem originally meant to use the concessions of an interlocutor as a basis for drawing a conclusion, thus forcing the interlocutor either to accept the conclusion or to retract a concession or to challenge the inference.

II. F. Later developments and interpretations

The concept of argumentum ex concessis evolved significantly through the works of later thinkers. Boethius (d. 524 CE) introduced the term disputatio temptativa, describing an argument where the speaker leads the opponent to a conclusion based on their own accepted premises. He explains that disputatio temptativa uses premises the opponent accepts or, at least, claims to know:

“[Disputatio temptativa are] those arguments that reason from premises which are accepted by the answerer and which anyone who pretends to possess knowledge of the subject, is bound to know. (Temptativa <est>, uit ait Aristotiles, que sillogizat ex his que videntur respondenti, et necessarium | est ei qui simulat se habere scientiam.)” (Boethius, Summa I, p. 275)

He further elaborates on the form of disputatio temptativa:

“The form of the temptativa is that he must […] return to the first premise, and from that, along with others that have been conceded, infer what one intends to prove. (Forma temptativa est quod debet […] reverti ad primam et ex illa atque aliis sibi concessis inferat quod intendit probare.)” (Ibid., p. 277)

In Europe, confusion regarding terminology arose early on, with argumentum ex concessis often referred to as argumentum ad hominem. Today, the term ad hominem usually refers to a fallacy that attacks the arguer’s character rather than addressing their argument. However, the ad hominem Boethius and his successors described aligns closely with argumentum ex concessis and is not a fallacy. For clarity, this approach is best termed argumentum ex concessis, also known as argument from commitment.

In the 17th century, Galileo Galilei (d. 1642) used the term ad hominem to describe arguments that compel an opponent to accept an unwelcome conclusion based on premises they have accepted, even if the arguer does not endorse these premises personally (M. A. Finocchiaro, The Concept of Ad Hominem Argument in Galileo and Locke, 1974).

John Locke (d. 1704) also adopted this view, defining ad hominem as pressing someone with conclusions drawn from their own principles:

“Thirdly, A third Way, is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad Hominem.” (John Locke, 1735, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London: A. Betteswort, Vol. 2, p. 306)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (d. 1716) furthered this concept, emphasising its value in revealing an opponent’s logical errors:

“The argument ad hominem has this effect, that it shows that one or the other assertion is false and that the opponent is deceived whatever way he takes it.” (G. W. Leibniz, 1765, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, London: Macmillan, pp. 576-577)

This approach underscores the foundational principle of argumentum ex concessis – using the opponent’s own statements to reveal contradictions in their reasoning.

Isaac Watts (d. 1748) reinforced this concept, noting that argumentum ad hominem addresses the opponent’s stated beliefs rather than objective truth:

“When it [i.e. an argument] is built upon the profest [i.e., professed] Principles or Opinions of the Person with whom we argue, whether these Opinions be true or false, it is named Argumentum ad Hominem, an Address to our profest Principles.” (Isaac Watts, 1729, Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry After Truth, London: Bible and Crown, p. 311)

Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) also acknowledged the persuasive power of argumentum ex concessis, particularly its effectiveness in silencing an opponent:

“One can prove much apagogically ex concessis, namely, when the other has already conceded something. These are argumenta ad hominem. In mathematics there are many such proofs. They are always excellent.” (Immanuel Kant, 2009, Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 483)

However, he cautioned that it does not necessarily lead to truth:

“An argumentum ad hominem is an argument that obviously is not true for everyone, but still serves to reduce someone to silence. E.g., when I get something ex concessis and from the particular propositions that someone else has. These are good means for getting someone off one’s back and for ending the dispute, but not for finding truth.” (Ibid., p. 241)

Arthur Schopenhauer (d. 1860) offered a clear distinction between argumentum ad rem (arguing to the matter) and argumentum ex concessis (arguing based on an opponent’s concessions):

“First of all, we must consider the essential nature of every dispute: what it is that really takes place in it. Our opponent has stated a thesis, or we ourselves, – it is all one. There are two modes of refuting it, and two courses that we may pursue.

“I. The modes are (1) ad rem, (2) ad hominem or ex concessis. That is to say: We may show either that the proposition is not in accordance with the nature of things, i.e., with absolute, objective truth; or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent, i.e., with truth as it appears to him. The latter mode of arguing a question produces only a relative conviction, and makes no difference whatever to the objective truth of the matter.” (Arthur Schopenhauer, 1896, The Art of Controversy and Other Posthumous Papers, London: Swan Sonnenschein, p. 13)

This distinction highlights how argumentum ex concessis serves as a tool for relative conviction, contrasting with arguments based on objective truth.

These thinkers illustrate the enduring value of argumentum ex concessis across philosophical traditions, from mediaeval scholasticism to Enlightenment thought. Despite shifts in terminology – particularly the blending of argumentum ex concessis with argumentum ad hominem – this form of reasoning has remained a powerful tool in philosophical and theological discourse. By leveraging the opponent’s own commitments, this approach continues to facilitate rigorous debate, exposing inconsistencies and promoting a deeper pursuit of truth. This tradition of dialectical engagement aligns with similar techniques in other intellectual traditions, such as ilzam in Islamic thought, further demonstrating the effectiveness of argumentum ex concessis in fostering critical reflection.

III. Ilzam in the Islamic tradition

Understanding ilzam requires recognising its deep roots within Islamic intellectual history. The integration of Aristotelian philosophy during the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries significantly shaped Islamic thought, including the development of kalam. Key works such as Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, and the Organon were meticulously rendered into Arabic, stimulating a wave of commentaries and expansions by Muslim intellectuals. This philosophical ferment coincided with, and significantly influenced, the development of Islamic theology (kalam).

However, Arabs and Muslims had long practised debate and intellectual exchange centuries before their formal encounter with Aristotelian dialectical works. Pre-Islamic Arab poets often composed satirical verses (al-hija’) or engaged in poetic battles known as an-naqa’id. Islamic scripture itself, the Quran, incorporates forms of dialectical disputation (mujadala), while Muslim legal and theological scholarship also featured traditions of dialectic (jadal) and disagreement literature (khilaf). These pre-Islamic and early Islamic traditions of argumentation coexisted alongside the newly imported Aristotelian methods.

By the late 3rd/9th century, Aristotelian logical works foundational to dialectic and disputation had been thoroughly studied and adapted by Islamic scholars. These developments, based on Aristotelian works, set the stage for philosophical theologians (mutakallimun) and jurists to engage deeply with both Greek thought and their native traditions of debate. However, to assert that the mutakallimun were merely influenced by Aristotle would be to overlook the complex and multifaceted nature of their intellectual heritage.

The Islamic corpus of argumentation was woven with innumerable and often untraceable threads. While some elements were undoubtedly Aristotelian, others emerged from Islamic and even pre-Islamic traditions. Some of these pre-Islamic elements may have even shaped Hellenic philosophy itself. Furthermore, certain Aristotelian influences were developed so extensively within Islamic thought that they evolved into unique and distinct strands. For instance, the practice of ilzam – strategically employing an opponent’s beliefs to reveal inconsistencies in their position – became a potent instrument in theological debate.

This convergence of native and foreign influences illustrates that while Aristotelian logic provided valuable tools, the Islamic tradition of debate was enriched by a multitude of diverse sources, including pre-Islamic Arab customs and early Islamic practices. The result was argumentation techniques that scholars, theologians, and jurists used to navigate and resolve complex intellectual disputes.

III. A. Defining ilzam

To understand the concept of ilzam within Islamic thought, it is essential to examine how it has been defined and understood by scholars throughout history. The term itself offers insights into its core meaning.

Ibn Faris (d. 395/1005), a renowned lexicographer of the Arabic language, explains in his Maqayis al-lugha:

اللام والزاء والميم أصل واحد صحيح، يدل على مصاحبة الشيء بالشيء دائما

“The letters lam, za’, and mim form a single, sound root that signifies the perpetual association of one thing with another.” (Ibn Faris, 1979, Mu‘jam maqayis al-lugha, ‘Abd as-Salam Muhammad Harun, ed. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, Vol. 5, p. 245)

This etymological analysis emphasises the idea of continual association inherent in ilzam, indicating a binding connection and constant attachment between two entities. This insight is crucial for grasping the fundamental nature of ilzam as a persistent, inseparable link.

Murtada az-Zabidi (d. 1205/1790), an expert in lexicography, defined ilzam in his voluminous dictionary Taj al-‘arus as follows:

والإلزام: التبكيت

“ilzam means to silence [an opponent].” (Murtada az-Zabidi, 2000, Taj al-‘arus min jawahir al-Qamus, ed. Ibrahim at-Tarzi, Kuwait: Matbaʻat Hukumat al-Kuwayt, Vol. 33, p. 422)

This definition highlights that ilzam aims to bring the debate to a decisive conclusion where the opponent is left without a valid counter-argument.

Hans Wehr’s (d. 1981) dictionary provides the following definition for the expression alzamahu l-hujja:

“to force proof on s.o., force s.o. to accept an argument.” (Hans Wehr, 1994, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, Urbana: Spoken Language Services, p. 1014)

This clarifies the purpose of ilzam: to compel an opponent in a disputation to accept the logical conclusions derived from their own stated beliefs or premises.

Hazrat Khalifatul-Masih I^ra (d. 1332/1914), while elaborating upon its strategic function, explained that the goal of ilzam is not merely to expose an opponent’s weakness but to provide them with an opportunity for self-correction and deeper understanding. He states:

الزامی جواب اس لئے بھی اختیار کیا جاتا ہے کہ معترض اپنی مسلمہ و مالوفہ کتابوں سے اس قسم کے اشتباہ کو رفع کر لے۔

“Ilzami responses are also employed so that the objector may remove that sort of doubt from their own established and familiar books.” (Nuruddin, 1963, Fasl al-khitab li-muqaddama Ahl al-Kitab, Rabwah: Matba’ Diya’ al-Islam, p. 193)

This perspective highlights the potential of ilzam to facilitate intellectual growth and deeper engagement with one’s own beliefs. By compelling the opponent to confront the implications of their established sources, ilzam encourages a process of self-reflection and critical analysis.

Various scholars have articulated the purpose of ilzam and its characteristics, highlighting its distinct role in theological debate.

Imam al-Juwayni (d. 478/1085), a prominent Ash‘ari scholar and teacher of al-Ghazali, offers a concise definition in his Kafiya:

فأما الإلزام: فهو دفع كلام الخصم بما يوجب فصلا بينه وبين ما تضمن نصرته

“As for ilzam, it is the repudiation of the opponent’s argument by means of what imposes a severance between him and what comprises his support.” (al-Juwayni, 1979, al-Kafiya fi l-jadal, ed. Fawqiyya Husayn Mahmud, Cairo: Matbaʻat ʻIsa al-Babi al-Halabi, p. 70, §173)

This definition emphasises the strategic nature of ilzam, aiming to create a separation between the opponent and the very principles they claim to support.

‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037), a leading Ash‘ari theologian and Shafi‘i jurist, provides a further definition in his ‘Iyar an-nazar. He writes:

أصل الإلزام: إظهار شهادة أصل لفرع، يريد السائل إلزام المسئول قوله فيه

“The rule of ilzam: To demonstrate evidence of a basis for a branch (far‘), where the questioner wants to compel the respondent to address it.” (‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, 2020, ‘Iyar an-nazar fi ‘ilm al-jadal, ed. Ahmad Muhammad ‘Arrubi, Hawally: Asfar li-Nashr Nafis al-Kutub wa-r-Rasaʼil al-ʻIlmiyya, p. 467)

This definition emphasises the methodical nature of ilzam, highlighting how it involves revealing the basis for a claim and forcing the opponent to engage with it directly.

Ibn ‘Aqil (d. 513/1119), a distinguished Hanbali theologian and jurist from Baghdad, provides another perspective:

والإلزام: هو التعليق على الخصم ما لا يقول به بدلالة ما يقول به

“Ilzam: It is pinning onto the adversary what he does not profess, by showing him that it follows as a consequence of what he does profess.” (Ibn ‘Aqil, 1999, al-Wadih fi usul al-fiqh, ed. ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin at-Turki, Beirut: Mu’assat ar-Risala, Vol. 1, p. 197)

This definition emphasises the aspect of compelling the opponent to accept unintended or undesirable consequences of their own beliefs.

In similar vein, ‘Ala’ ad-Din al-Mardawi (885/1480), a Hanbali scholar from Damascus, emphasises the strategic outcome of ilzam in theological debates:

[حقيقة] الإلزام […] إلجاء الخصم إلى الاعتراف بنقيض دليله إجمالا، حيث دل على نفي ما هو الحق عنده على صورة النزاع

“[The essence of] ilzam […] is forcing the opponent to acknowledge the contradiction of his evidence in general, where he indicates the negation of what he believes to be the truth in the form of the dispute.” (al-Mardawi, 2000, at-Tahbir sharh at-Tahrir fi usul al-fiqh, ed. ʻAbd ar-Rahṃan ibn ʻAbd Allah al-Jibrin, Riyadh: Maktabat ar-Rushd, Vol. 2, p. 736)

This definition illuminates the tactical dimension of ilzam, highlighting how it functions not merely to expose inconsistencies, but to compel the opponent to recognise that their own argumentation undermines their position.

Adding to this, the Quranic scholar and Egyptian Shafi‘i jurist Badr ad-Din az-Zarkashi (d. 794/1392) emphasises the conclusive nature of ilzam in forcing the opponent to concede:

والالزام عبارة عن انتهاء دليل المستدل إلى مقدمات ضرورية أو يقيني مشهور، يلزم المعترض الاعتراف به ولا يمكنه جحده فينقطع بذلك

“And ilzam is an expression referring to the arguer’s evidence ending at necessary premises or a well-known certainty that the objector is bound to acknowledge and cannot deny, so he is cut off by that.” (az-Zarkashi, 1998, Tashnif al-masamiʻ bi-Jamʻ al-jawamiʻ, ed. Sayyid ʻAbd al-ʻAziz; ʻAbd Allah Rabiʻ, Cairo: Maktab Qurtuba li-l-Bahth wa-l-ʻIlmi wa-Ihyaʼ at-Turath al-Islami, Vol. 3, p. 400)

Moving beyond general definitions, as-Sayyid ash-Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413), a leading Ash‘ari theologian, logician and philosopher from Samarqand, in his at-Ta‘rifat provides a concise definition that highlights the role of the opponent’s premises:

الدليل الإلزامي: ما سلم عند الخصم، سواء كان مستدلا عند الخصم أو لا

“Argument from commitment (ad-dalil al-ilzami): That which is among the accepted premises of the opponent, whether it is a proffered position of the opponent or not.” (ash-Sharif al-Jurjani, 1983, Kitab at-Ta‘rifat, Dar al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyya, p. 104)

Similarly, Muhammad ‘Ali Thanvi (d. 1191/1777), an erudite Hanafi lexicologist from India, states in Kashshaf istilahat al-funun, his encyclopaedia of technical terms which he completed 1158/1745, under the entry for hujja:

والحجة الإلزامية هي المركبة من المقدمات المسلمة عند الخصم المقصود منها إلزام الخصم وإسكاته

“The argument from commitment (al-hujja al-ilzamiyya) is composed of premises accepted by the opponent, and its purpose is to obligate the opponent and silence him.” (Muhammad ‘Ali Thanvi, 1853, Kashshaf istilahat al-funun, ed. Muhammad Wajih; ‘Abd al-Haqq; Ghulam Qadir, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. 2, p. 284)

The Gujarati scholar ‘Abd an-Nabi Ahmadnagari, in his well-known 12th/18th-century encyclopaedic work Dustur al-‘ulama’, further clarifies this:

الجواب الإلزامي: هو الجواب بما هو مسلم عند الخصم وإن كان فاسدا في نفس الأمر

“Dialectical response (al-jawab al-ilzami): A response based on what is accepted by the opponent, even if it is actually incorrect.” (‘Abd an-Nabi Ahmadnagari, 1911, Jamiʻ al-ʻulum: al-mulaqqab bi-Dastur al-ʻulamaʼ fi isṭilahat al-ʻulum wa-l-funun, Hyderabad: Matbaʻat Daʼirat al-Maʻarif an-Nizamiyya, Vol. 1, p. 420)

These definitions emphasise that ilzam is not about imposing external truths but about using the opponent’s own accepted beliefs to expose inconsistencies or lead them to conclusions they find problematic. Indeed, ilzam relies on the opponent’s own accepted beliefs, even if those beliefs might be flawed. This highlights the subjective nature of ilzam in contrast to demonstrative reasoning, which seeks to establish objective truths.

Having established the definition and scholarly understanding of ilzam, it is crucial to examine its presence within the foundational text of Islam, the Holy Quran. As the primary source of Islamic teachings, the Quran’s utilisation of ilzam demonstrates the method’s inherent legitimacy within the Islamic intellectual tradition. This section will explore specific examples of ilzam in the Quran, analysing how this technique is employed to address various theological and philosophical issues.

III. B. Ilzam in the Quran and Sunnah

The Quran, while primarily focused on conveying divine truths and guidance, frequently engages in discourse with those who oppose or question its teachings. In these instances, the Quran employs various argumentative strategies, including ilzam, to address challenges and to expose the inconsistencies inherent in opposing viewpoints.

III. B. 1. The Quran’s use of ilzam

The Quran’s use of ilzam often takes the form of presenting hypothetical scenarios or posing rhetorical questions that lead the reader to recognise the absurdity or contradiction inherent in a particular belief or claim.

Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi (d. 606/1210) states in his at-Tafsir al-kabir that the Quran employs various methods to establish the truth of Islam, including dialectical (ilzami) proofs:

اعلم أنا قد بينا أن الله تعالى استدل على صحة دين محمد ﷺ بوجوه، بعضها إلزامية، وهو أن هذا الدين دين إبراهيم فوجب قبوله، وهو المراد بقوله: وَمَنۡ يَّرۡغَبُ عَنۡ مِّلَّةَ اِبۡرٰهٖمَ اِلَّا مَنۡ سَفِهَ نَفۡسَهٗ

“Know that we have already clarified that Allah the Exalted has established proof of the truth of Muhammad’s^sa religion in multiple ways. Some of these proofs are dialectical (ilzamiyya), such as stating that this religion is the religion of Abraham, and thus it must be accepted. This is what is meant by the verse: ‘And who will turn away from the religion of Abraham but he who makes a fool of himself?’ (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:131)” (Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, 1999, at-Tafsir al-kabir, Beirut: Ihya’ at-Turath al-‘Arabi, Vol. 4, p. 122)

Ar-Razi further highlights the Quran’s use of dialectic (jadal), which he considers one of the three methods of engaging with others, as mentioned in the Quran:

اُدۡعُ اِلٰی سَبِیۡلِ رَبِّکَ بِالۡحِکۡمَۃِ وَالۡمَوۡعِظَۃِ الۡحَسَنَۃِ وَجَادِلۡہُمۡ بِالَّتِیۡ ہِیَ اَحۡسَنُ

“Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation and argue with them in a way that is best.” (Surah an-Nahl, 16:125)

Alongside wisdom (hikma) and goodly exhortation (maw‘iza hasana), jadal aims to compel the opponent (ilzam) using premises they already accept. The goal is to expose contradictions in the opponent’s position, forcing them to confront the logical consequences of their own beliefs.

Ar-Razi states that:

واعلم أن الدعوة إلى المذهب والمقالة لا بد وأن تكون مبنية على حجة وبينة، والمقصود من ذكر الحجة، إما تقرير ذلك المذهب وذلك الاعتقاد في قلوب المستمعين، وإما أن يكون المقصود إلزام الخصم وإفحامه

“Know that inviting to a doctrine or belief must necessarily be based on evidence and proof, and the purpose of presenting such evidence is either to establish that doctrine and belief in the hearts of the listeners, or the aim is to compel the opponent (ilzam al-khasm) and silence him.” (Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 286)

In his discussion of jadal, ar-Razi highlights the ideal form of this method:

أن يكون دليلاً مركباً من مقدمات مسلمة في المشهور عند الجمهور، أو من مقدمات مسلمة عند ذلك القائل، وهذا الجدل هو الجدل الواقع على الوجه الأحسن

“[T]hat the argument is composed of premises that are accepted either by the public or at least by the opponent. This form of debate is the one that occurs in the best manner.” (Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 287)

This method of jadal, which is the best form, uses the opponent’s own accepted premises to challenge them. Ar-Razi notes that this is the type of argumentation referred to in the Quranic command: “and argue with them in a way that is best” (wa-jadilhum bi-llati hiya ahsan). By emphasising ilzam, ar-Razi shows that the most effective form of jadal is one that compels the opponent by using their own beliefs, leading them to acknowledge the logical consequences of their position. This method aligns with both logical consistency and ethical argumentation.

The Quran’s use of ilzam often takes the form of presenting hypothetical scenarios or posing rhetorical questions that lead the reader to recognise the absurdity or contradiction inherent in a particular belief or claim. For instance, in challenging polytheistic beliefs, the Quran utilises ilzam to demonstrate the logical impossibility of multiple gods:

قُلۡ لَّوۡ کَانَ مَعَہٗۤ اٰلِـہَۃٌ کَمَا یَقُوۡلُوۡنَ اِذًا لَّابۡتَغَوۡا اِلٰی ذِی الۡعَرۡشِ سَبِیۡلًا

“Say, ‘Had there been other gods with Him as they allege, then certainly (by their help the idolaters) would have sought out a way to the Owner of the Throne.’” (Surah al-Isra’, Ch.17: V.43)

This verse employs ilzam by positing a hypothetical scenario: if there were truly multiple gods, as polytheists claim, then those gods would inevitably seek to usurp each other’s power and authority. This scenario, however, contradicts the observed order and harmony within the universe, implicitly demonstrating the falsehood of polytheism.

Another example is found in Surah al-Mu’minun, where the Quran challenges the notion of associating partners with Allah:

مَا اتَّخَذَ اللّٰہُ مِنۡ وَّلَدٍ وَّمَا کَانَ مَعَہٗ مِنۡ اِلٰہٍ اِذًا لَّذَہَبَ کُلُّ اِلٰہٍۭ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَا بَعۡضُہُمۡ عَلٰی بَعۡضٍ ؕ سُبۡحٰنَ اللّٰہِ عَمَّا یَصِفُوۡنَ

“Allah has not taken unto Himself any son, nor is there any other god along with Him; in that case each god would have taken away what he had created, and some of them would, surely, have sought domination over others. Glorified be Allah (far) above that which they allege.” (Surah al-Mu’minun, Ch.23: V.92)

Here, the Quran uses ilzam to show that if there were multiple gods, each would claim ownership and control over their creations, leading to conflict and chaos. This again contradicts the observed order and unity within creation, pointing towards the logical conclusion of a single, supreme God.

The Quran also utilises ilzam to address those who deny the possibility of divine revelation. In Surah al-An‘am, for example, it responds to the claim that God has not revealed anything to humankind:

اِذۡ قَالُوۡا مَاۤ اَنۡزَلَ اللّٰہُ عَلٰی بَشَرٍ مِّنۡ شَیۡءٍ ؕ قُلۡ مَنۡ اَنۡزَلَ الۡکِتٰبَ الَّذِیۡ جَآءَ بِہٖ مُوۡسٰی

“[W]hen they say, ‘Allah has not revealed anything to any man.’ Say, ‘Who revealed the Book which Moses brought?’” (Surah al-An‘am, Ch.6: V.92)

This verse employs ilzam by challenging the objector to explain the origin of previous scriptures, such as the Torah revealed to Moses^as. If they acknowledge the divine origin of those scriptures, then their claim that God does not reveal anything to humans becomes self-contradictory.

This method of ilzam within the Quran encourages critical thinking and reflection. By presenting hypothetical scenarios or posing pointed questions, it compels the reader to confront the logical consequences of their beliefs and to recognize the inconsistencies inherent in those who oppose the Quran’s message.

Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333/944), the eponymous founder of the Maturidi school of Islamic theology, recognises the Quran’s use of ilzam:

وطريقة إلزام الخصم نأخذها من القرآن الكريم، فحينما جاء الحبر السمين وقال للنبي ﷺ: ﴿ما أنزل الله على بشر من شيء﴾ يريد بذلك إنكار نبوة محمد، فرد القرآن عليه: ﴿قل من أنزل الكتاب الذي جاء به موسى﴾ وهذا إلزام أقر به الخصم

“The method of compelling the opponent (ilzam al-khasm) is taken from the Quran itself. For example, when the stout rabbi came to the Prophet^sa and said, ‘Allah has not revealed anything to any man,’ in an attempt to deny the prophethood of Muhammad^sa, the Quran responded by saying, Say, ‘Who revealed the Book which Moses brought?’, which was a form of ilzam that the opponent had to acknowledge.” (al-Maturidi, 2005, Ta’wilat Ahl as-sunna, ed. Majdi Basallum, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Vol. 1, p. 148)

Al-Qurtubi also illustrates the use of ilzam in the Quran in his exegesis. In the commentary on the story of Abraham^as breaking the idols in Surah al-Anbiya’, al-Qurtubi highlights how Abraham’s^as statement about the largest idol may force his opponents to confront the inconsistency of their beliefs:

وقيل: أي لم ينكرون أن يكون فعله كبيرهم؟ فهذا إلزام بلفظ الخبر. أي من اعتقد عبادتها يلزمه أن يثبت لها فعلا، والمعنى: بل فعله كبيرهم فيما يلزمكم.

“It is said: did they not deny that the largest of them could have done it? This is an ilzam that is expressed in the form of a declarative statement. Whoever believes in their worship is bound (yalzamuhu) to attribute action to them. The meaning is: ‘Rather, their largest one did it, according to what you are bound to accept (yalzamukum).’” (al-Qurtubi, 1967, al-Jami‘ li-ahkam al-Quran, ed. Abu Ishaq Ibrahim Atfish, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, Vol. 11, p. 300)

Al-Qurtubi’s explanation shows how Abraham’s^as statement forces his audience to confront the absurdity of their beliefs by compelling them to acknowledge the logical consequences of idol worship.

III. B. 2. The Promised Messiah’s^as perspective on Quranic ilzam

The Promised Messiah^as, in his writings, also refers to the Quran’s use of ilzam to counter those who rejected its message. He states:

چنانچہ اوّل ان کے اسکات و الزام کے لیے ہر ایک قسم کے نشان قرآن شریف نے پیش کئے، مگر انہوں نے اپنے تعصب کی وجہ سے ان دلائل کو قبول نہ کیا۔ آخر جب انہوں نے کسی دلیل کو قبول نہ کیا۔ اور کسی نشان پر ایمان نہ لائے۔ تو اتمام حجت کی غرض سے مباہلہ کے لیے ان سے درخواست کی گئی۔

“Therefore, initially, the Holy Quran presented all kinds of signs to render them [the Christians] silent (iskat) and refute (ilzam) them. However, due to their prejudice, they did not accept these arguments. Finally, when they refused to accept any proof or believe in any sign, they were invited to a prayer duel (mubahala) for the purpose of conclusive argumentation (itmam-e ḥujjat).” (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 2019, Majmu‘a-e ishtiharat, Qadian: Nazarat-e Nashr-o-Isha‘at, Vol. 1, p. 232)

As an illustration of the Quran’s use of ilzam, the Promised Messiah^as provides the following example in the context of addressing the Christian belief in Jesus^as as the son of God:

جواب دو قسم کے ہوتے ہیں۔ ایک تحقیقی، دوسرے الزامی۔ اﷲ تعالیٰ نے بھی بعض جگہ الزامی جوابوں سے کام لیا ہے۔ اس میں معترض کو اپنے مذہب کی کمزوری معلوم ہوتی ہے۔ چنانچہ جب عیسائیوں نے کہا کہ عیسٰی خدا کا بیٹا ہے اور دلیل یہ کہ مریم کنواری کے پیٹ سے پیدا ہوا تو ﷲ تعالیٰ نے فرمایا۔ اِنَّ مَثَلَ عِیۡسٰی عِنۡدَ اللّٰہِ کَمَثَلِ اٰدَم یعنی اگر یہی اس کا بیٹا ہونے کا ثبوت ہے تو آدم بطریق اوّل بیٹا ہونا چاہئیے۔

“Replies are of two types. One by way of tahqiq and the other by way of ilzam. Allah the Exalted has also made use of ilzami replies in certain instances. These inform the critic of the weakness of his own religious worldview. Thus, when the Christians claimed that Jesus is the Son of God and its proof is that he was born of the Virgin Mary, Allah the Exalted replied by saying:

اِنَّ مَثَلَ عِیۡسٰی عِنۡدَ اللّٰہِ کَمَثَلِ اٰدَم

Meaning that if this indeed was the proof of him being the Son [of God] then Adam has the first right to be the Son [of God]. (Surah Al ‘Imran, Ch.3: V.60)” (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 2022, Malfuzat [Urdu], Farnham: Islam International Publications Ltd., Vol. 10, p. 316)

Here, the Promised Messiah^as highlights how the Quran uses ilzam to point out the flawed logic in the Christian claim. If virgin birth were sufficient proof of divine sonship, then Adam would have an even stronger claim to that title.

The Quran, as exemplified by these examples, utilises a variety of argumentative strategies in its engagement with both polytheistic beliefs and the doctrines of the People of the Book. While ilzam is employed to expose inconsistencies and prompt reflection, other approaches, such as providing direct evidence and appealing to reason and observation, are also used.

III. C. The mechanics of ilzam

Having seen ilzam employed within the Quran itself, it is now helpful to examine in greater detail the mechanics of this argumentative technique – how it functions to achieve its intended purpose. Ilzam centres around the principle that every proposition carries inherent consequences. This involves confronting an opponent with the logical implications of their own statements, even if these consequences are not immediately apparent or explicitly stated. Through ilzam, inconsistencies or contradictions emerging from a flawed premise are brought to light, often revealing the weakness of the original position.

In practice, ilzam presents the opponent with a dilemma: either accept the problematic implications of their view, or abandon their initial position. Since individuals are often unaware of these logical consequences until explicitly exposed through ilzam, it becomes a powerful tool for challenging deeply held but poorly examined beliefs.

This approach resonates with Imam al-Ghazali’s (d. 505/1111) discussion of logical consequence (lazim) and its premise (malzum) in al-Mustasfa:

فإن كل إثبات له لوازم، فإنتفاء اللازم يدل على إنتفاء الملزوم

“Every affirmation has consequents (lawazim), and the negation of the consequent (lazim) indicates the negation of the antecedent (malzum).” (al-Ghazali, 1993, al-Mustasfa, ed. Muhammad ‘Abd as-Salam ‘Abd ash-Shafi, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, p. 163)

Al-Ghazali highlights that demonstrating the falsehood or absurdity of a proposition’s consequences directly undermines the validity of the original proposition itself. This is precisely the mechanism employed in ilzam, where, by demonstrating the untenable consequences of an opponent’s claim, the flaws in their reasoning are revealed. This reflects the logical principle known as modus tollens, which states that if a conditional statement (“if P, then Q”) is true, and the consequent (Q) is false, then the antecedent (P) must also be false.

The process of ilzam typically unfolds as follows: the obligating party (mulzim) begins by presenting a premise (malzum) already accepted by the opponent. Building on this accepted premise, the mulzim constructs a logical argument leading to a conclusion (lazim) that the opponent cannot readily dispute. The strength of ilzam lies in its logical rigour: once the opponent accepts the initial premise, they are compelled to accept its logical implications, even if it contradicts their broader stance.

For an argument to qualify as ilzam, three conditions must be met:

1. The premise must be accepted by the opponent.
2. The opponent must not dispute the conclusion drawn from the premise.
3. There must be a clear and necessary logical connection between premise and conclusion. A demonstrable disconnect invalidates the ilzam.

The logical structure of ilzam often involves a disjunctive syllogism (qisma or taqsim), systematically eliminating propositions to affirm a sole remaining possibility. This relies on basic inference (istidlal) from immediate data acting as an indicator (dalil). The indicator’s validity rests on a causal relationship (‘illa) between it and the signified object. Once this causal link’s relevance is established, the argument is deemed valid.

Ilzam functions by using the opponent’s own beliefs against them, making the arguer’s personal stance irrelevant. The antecedent is granted and the consequent is affirmed, solely to demonstrate the problematic implications of the opponent’s view. This has been a key technique in Islamic theology, allowing scholars to refute doctrines without personally endorsing the counterarguments.

‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi categorises ilzam into six forms, each with a different method of logical implication:

1. Causality (al-‘illa): The accepted principle necessitates a specific, and perhaps problematic, effect.
2. Opposition (al-mu‘arada): Exposing contradictions between the opponent’s accepted ideas.
3. Indication (ad-dalala): Using accepted evidence to compel acceptance of a related conclusion.
4. Division (at-taqsim): Showing how every logical possibility of an opponent’s argument leads to an unacceptable outcome.
5. General Meaning (i‘ta’ al-ma‘na fi l-jumla): Applying the broader implications of the opponent’s argument consistently to demonstrate unintended consequences.
6. Rational Implication (iqtida’ al-‘aql): Using pure logic to compel the opponent to accept a conclusion necessitated by their premises, without external evidence. (‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, ibid., pp. 469-471)

III. D. The strategic nature of ilzam: Dissociating argument from belief

While ilzam relies on logical deductions from an opponent’s accepted premises, it is crucial to understand that employing this method does not necessitate personal belief in those premises or the resulting conclusions. It can function as a strategic tool to highlight the inherent weaknesses or inconsistencies within an opposing viewpoint, even if the arguer does not subscribe to the specific premises used in the process. Indeed, scholars throughout Islamic history have recognised this strategic nature of ilzam, distinguishing between its function as a tool of refutation and the arguer’s own theological convictions.

In the concept of the dialectical strategy of ilzam, the debater may utilise arguments to expose the logical inconsistencies of their opponent’s position, even if they do not personally subscribe to the premises of those arguments. This technique prioritises demonstrating the absurdity or incoherence of the opponent’s stance, compelling them to reconsider.

Al-Ghazali, in his influential work Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), articulated this approach:

فأبطل عليهم ما اعتقدوه مقطوعا، بإلزامات مختلفة؛ فألزمهم تارة مذهب المعتزلة، وأخرى مذهب الكرامية، وطورا مذهب الواقفية

“I will render murky what they believe in [by showing] conclusively that they must hold to various consequences (ilzamat) [of their theories]. Thus, I hold them to the [full and undesirable] consequences of their doctrine (ulzimuhum) by arguing at times from the position of the Mu‘tazila, at times from the position of the Karramiyya, and at other times from the position of the Waqifiyya.” (al-Ghazali, 1966, Tahafut al-falasifa, ed. Sulayman Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, p. 82)

al-Ghazali later elaborated on this approach in his al-Iqtisad fī l-i‘tiqad, explicitly stating that some of the positions he adopted in Tahafut al-falasifa did not represent his actual doctrines. They were only assumed for the sake of argument: he wanted to show that the philosophers’ premises did not lead to their conclusions. Referring to an instance in which he used ilzam, he states:

وقد أطنبنا في هذه المسألة في كتاب التهافت، وسلكنا في إبطال مذهبهم تقرير بقاء النفس التي هي غير متحيز عندهم وتقدير عود تدبيرها إلى البدن سواء كان ذلك البدن هو عين جسم الانسان أو غيره، وذلك إلزام لا يوافق ما نعتقده؛ فإن ذلك الكتاب مصنف لابطال مذهبهم لا لاثبات المذهب الحق، ولكنهم لما قدروا أن الانسان هو ما هو باعتبار نفسه وأن اشتغاله بتدبير كالعارض له والبدن آلة لهم، ألزمناهم بعد اعتقادهم بقاء النفس وجوب التصديق بالاعادة وذلك برجوع النفس إلى تدبير بدن من الأبدان

“We have discussed this matter with elaboration in the book at-Tahafut, and based our refutation of their doctrine on positing the persistence of the soul, which for them is not extended, and positing its return to govern a body, whether this body is the exact same body of the man or another body. This is an ilzam that is not in accordance with what we believe; for that book was composed to refute their doctrines, not to establish the true doctrines (madhhab al-haqq). Given that they assumed that man is what he is by virtue of his soul and that his occupation with governing a body is accidental to him, and since, according to them, the body is an instrument, we made an ilzam on them – since they believe in the persistence of the soul – to affirm the reality of re-creation as the return of the soul to its governing a body – any body.” (al-Ghazali, 2004, al-Iqtisad fi l-i‘tiqad, ed. ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Khalili, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, p. 117)

Al-Ghazali’s explanation clarifies that his goal in the Tahafut was to demonstrate the limitations of the philosophers’ arguments, not to endorse the alternative positions he employed through ilzam. This highlights the strategic nature of ilzam: it allows for the deconstruction of an opponent’s argument without requiring the debater to subscribe to the specific premises used in the refutation.

Sayf ad-Din al-Amidi (d. 631/1233), a major Ash‘ari theologian, rationalist philosopher and Shafi‘i jurist, in his Abkar al-afkar, echoes this sentiment:

قلنا: ما يذكر بطريق الإلزام لا يلزم أن يكون معتقدا للملزم

“We said: What is mentioned by way of ilzam is not necessarily something the one employing it (al-mulzim) believes in.” (al-Amidi, 2004, Abkar al-afkar fi usul ad-din, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Mahdi,  Cairo: Matbaʻat Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Wathaʼiq al-Qawmiyya, Vol. 1, p. 507)

This statement explicitly states that the one using ilzam may not personally subscribe to the premises or conclusions employed. The focus is on demonstrating the logical consequences of the opponent’s position, not on advocating for the arguer’s own beliefs.

Therefore, employing ilzam does not necessitate belief in its premises. Agreement with an opponent’s claims for the sake of argument does not equate to endorsing those claims as truth. This distinction is important for understanding the legitimacy of ilzam and for deflecting accusations of hypocrisy or insincerity.

Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), the Cordoban polymath, in al-Taqrib li-hadd al-mantiq, exemplifies this point by addressing a common accusation levelled against Muslims:

وكثيرا ما يحتج علينا اليهود بأننا قد وافقناهم على أن دينهم قد كان حقا ونبيهم حق ويريدون من ها هنا إلزامنا الإقرار به حتى الآن فاضبط هذا المكان واعلم أنا إنما وافقناهم على مقدماتهم

“Often the Jews argue against us that we have agreed with them that their religion was true and their prophet was true, and from this, they want to compel us to acknowledge it even now. So grasp this point and know that we have only agreed with them on their premises.” (Ibn Hazm, 1983, Rasa’il Ibn Hazm, ed. Ihsan ‘Abbas, Beirut: al-Muʼassasa al-ʻArabiyya li-d-Dirasat wa-n-Nashr, Vol. 4, p. 269)

This passage illustrates that agreement on premises for the sake of argument does not necessarily imply endorsement of the opponent’s position.

In conclusion, ilzam, when employed strategically, allows for the exposure of flaws in an opposing argument without requiring the arguer to personally endorse the premises or conclusions utilised.

III. D. Distinguishing dialectic from demonstration

Understanding the relationship between ilzam and other forms of argumentation, particularly demonstrative proof, i.e., burhan or tahqiq, is crucial for a comprehensive appreciation of ilzam‘s role in Islamic theological discourse. This section will explore how classical Islamic scholars and the Promised Messiah^as distinguished between these methods, highlighting their distinct characteristics, objectives, and applications.

Ilzam operates as a subjective or relative argument. It is relative because it depends on principles that are not necessarily universally true but are accepted by the opponent. The arguer uses these principles to force the opponent into a logical impasse, exposing contradictions within their beliefs. This often involves demonstrating the problematic consequences that arise from the opponent’s position.

In contrast, burhan or tahqiq is an objective or absolute form of argumentation (argumentum ad veritatem), grounded in universally accepted principles. It seeks to establish truths independent of any opponent’s views. This approach is employed when the goal is to demonstrate a universally valid truth rather than simply refuting an opponent’s position.

This distinction between demonstrative and dialectical argumentation has deep roots in the philosophical tradition that influenced Islamic thought. Aristotle provides a clear articulation of this distinction:

“Now a deduction is an argument in which, certain things being laid down something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a demonstration, when the premisses from which the deduction starts are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primitive and true; and it is a dialectical deduction, if it reasons from reputable opinions.” (Aristotle, Topics, 100a25–26).

This Aristotelian framework, distinguishing between arguments based on true and primitive premises versus those based on reputable opinions, provided a philosophical foundation that Islamic scholars would build upon and adapt to their theological discussions.

III. D. 1. Classical Islamic perspectives

Classical Islamic scholars recognised the distinction between ilzam and burhan, employing both methods strategically within their theological discourse.

Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), a towering figure in Islamic philosophy, provides valuable insights into these distinct forms of argumentation. He discusses how dialectic (jadal) and burhan function within the broader context of debate or disputation (munazara). He explains that every syllogistic address (khitab qiyasi) aims at tasdiq, i.e., credibility, belief, or acceptance, and those syllogistic addresses which aim at tasdiq either intend to clarify truth (al-idah li-l-haqq) – which can be achieved through demonstration (burhan) and instruction (ta‘lim) – or intend victory (ghalaba) and forcing conclusions (ilzam):

والتي القصد فيها التصديق فإما أن يكون المراد فيها الإيضاح للحق، وهو البرهان والتعليم؛ وإما أن يكون الراد فيها الغلبة والإلزام

“And those [syllogistic addresses] that aim at credibility (tasdiq) either intend to uncover the truth (al-idah li-l-haqq), which is demonstration (burhan) and instruction (ta‘lim), or intend victory (ghalaba) and forcing conclusions (ilzam).” (Ibn Sina, 1965, Kitab ash-Shifa’, al-Mantiq, al-Jadal, ed. Ahmad Fu’ad al-Ahwani, Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Amiriyya, p. 18)

This categorisation of syllogistic addresses reveals a crucial aspect of ilzam: its potential to be employed for achieving victory in a debate, rather than solely for clarifying truth. This emphasis on prevailing over the opponent, through compelling them to accept a position, aligns ilzam with the broader category of jadal, as Ibn Sina further clarifies:

واسم المناظرة مشتق من النظر، والنظر لا يدل على غلبة أو معاندة بوجه. وأما الجدل فإنه يدل على تسلط بقوة الحطاب في الإلزام

“The word munazara is derived from nazar, and nazar signifies neither victory (ghalaba) nor contention (mu‘anada). But jadal signifies prevailing through speech in forcing one’s opponent to accept one’s position (ilzam)”. (Ibid., p. 20)

This explanation highlights the forceful and persuasive nature of jadal, as it involves compelling the opponent to accept a position. This emphasis on prevailing over the opponent through ilzam distinguishes jadal from the approach of munazara.

This understanding of the limitations of jadal contrasts with the definitive nature of burhan. Avicenna, for instance, succinctly articulates this point:

لا يفيد اليقين إلا البرهان

“Nothing yields certainty except burhan.” (Ibid., p. 11)

This statement emphasises that burhan possesses a unique epistemic quality: it alone can produce certainty (yaqin) regarding the truth of a proposition.  While jadal, including the technique of ilzam, may effectively compel or silence an opponent, it does not necessarily lead to the same level of epistemic certainty that burhan aims to achieve.

Al-Ghazali offers a concise distinction between demonstrative and dialectical arguments in his Mustasfa based on the nature of their premises:

فإن كانت المقدمات قطعية سميناها برهانا، وإن كانت مسلمة سميناها قياسا جدليا

“If the premises are definitive (qat‘iyya), we call it demonstration (burhan), and if the premises are [merely] accepted (musallama), we call it dialectical syllogism (qiyas jadali).” (al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, ibid., p. 31)

This statement clearly delineates the epistemological distinction between burhan and dialectical arguments like ilzam. For al-Ghazali, the key difference lies in the nature of the premises used: burhan relies on premises that are definitively true (qat‘iyya), while dialectical arguments use premises that are simply accepted (musallama) by the opponent, regardless of their objective truth value. This aligns with the broader classical understanding that burhan aims at establishing truth, while dialectical methods like ilzam aim at victory in debate through the opponent’s own concessions.

‘Abd an-Nabi Ahmadnagari offers a more concise distinction between demonstrative and dialectical arguments:

ثم اعلم أن الدليل تحقيقي وإلزامي. (والدليل التحقيقي) ما يكون في نفس الأمر ومسلما عند الخصمين. (والدليل الإلزامي) ما ليس كذلك فيقال هذا عندكم لا عندي

“Furthermore, an argument (dalil) can be either demonstrative (tahqiqi) or dialectical (ilzami). The tahqiqi dalil is what is true in reality and accepted by both disputants. The ilzami dalil is not so, and it is said, ‘This is valid according to you, not according to me.’” (‘Abd an-Nabi Ahmadnagari, ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 108-109)

Ibn Wahb al-Katib (d. 335/947) elaborates on this distinction in his Burhan, contrasting the aims of bahth (research) and jadal (dialectic), which correlate with burhan and ilzam, respectively:

وحق الجدل أن تبنى مقدماته بما يوافق الخصم عليه، وإن لم يكن نهاية الظهور للعقل، وليس هذا سبيل البحث، لأن حق الباحث أن يبني مقدماته بما هو أظهر الأشياء في نفسه، وأثبتها لعقله، لأن يطلب البرهان ويقصد لغاية التبيين والبيان، وألا يلتفت على إقرار مخالفه. فأما المجادل فلما كان قصد، إنما هو إلزام خصمه الحجة، كان أوكد الأشياء أن يلزمه إياها من قوله

“The proper approach to dialectic (jadal) is to construct its premises based on what the opponent agrees with, even if it is not the most self-evident to reason. This differs from the method of research (bahth), as a researcher (bahith) should base their premises on what is most apparent to themselves and most firmly established in their own mind. The researcher seeks demonstrative proof (burhan) and aims for ultimate clarity and explanation, without concern for their opponent’s acknowledgment. As for the debater (mujadil), since their intention is only to force conclusions (ilzam) upon their opponent with proof (hujja), the most effective approach is to force conclusions (ilzam) upon them using their own words.” (Ibn Wahb al-Katib, 1969, al-Burhan fi wujuh al-bayan, ed. Hifni Muhammad Sharaf, Cairo: Maktabat ash-Shabab, p. 179)

‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi further elucidates the roles of burhan and ilzam within kalam:

أصل الآلات في علم الكلام شيئان، هما: البرهان والإلزام.

“The primary instruments in ‘ilm al-kalam are two things: (i) proof (burhan), and (ii) refutation (ilzam).” (‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, ibid., p. 151)

Thus, kalam employs both burhan for constructive argumentation and ilzam for deconstructive refutation.

Ibn as-Salah at one point clarifies the respective contexts for each method:

الإلزام يصلح للمناظر في مقام الجدل دون مقام التحقيق

“Ilzam is suitable for the debater (munazir) in the context of dialectical debate (jadal), but not in the context of verification or thorough investigation (tahqiq).” (Ibn as-Salah, 2011, Sharh mushkil al-Wasit, ed. ʻAbd al-Munʻim Khalifa Ahmad Bilal, Riyadh: Dar Kunuz Ishbilya li-n-Nashr wa-t-Tawziʻ, Vol. 2, p. 211)

Finally, there are certain situations in which scholars even considered ilzam to be preferable to burhan. Najm ad-Din at-Tufi (d. 716/1316) provides such an example. He argues that against the notion of absolute free will (qadar), ilzam should be employed instead of demonstrative methods due to the topic’s inherent complexity and the limitations of human comprehension:

اعلم أن هذه المسألة، أعني مسألة القدر، هي سر من أسرار الله سبحانه، لا سبيل لبشر إلى الاطلاع على كنهه وحقيقته، إلا إن شاء الله. […]

وإنما غرضنا وغرض غيرنا بالكلام فيها دفع شبه الخصوم […]. فإذا تبين بطلانها، رجع الشخص إلى ما جاء به الشرع، من الإيمان والتسليم، بقلب من الشبهات نقي سليم. […]

فلهذا، كل من وقفنا على كلامه في هذه المسألة من القدرية، إنما نجيبهم بالمدافعات والإلزامات، بأن نبين أن الاشكال الذي يوردونه لازم عليهم، ولا نأتي في توجيه حقيقة المسألة بما يمثل إليه العقل مثله إلى شبه الخصوم.

“Know that this issue, I mean the issue of free will (qadar), is one of the mysteries (asrar) of Allah the Most Glorified, the nature (kunh) and reality (haqiqa) of which no human being has a route to realise, except by the will of God. […]

“Indeed, our objective, and the objective of others, in discussing it is to respond to the fallacies of opponents […]. Once their falsehood is made apparent, one will revert to what revealed religion (shar‘) stipulates, namely having belief (iman) and acquiescent assent (taslim) in a heart that is clear (naqiyy) and free (salim) of fallacies (shubuhat) […].

“Therefore, when we address the discussions of Qadaris on this issue, we only respond to them in the manner of rebuttal (mudafa‘a) and ilzam, by showing that the dubiety (ishkal) that they raise will in fact apply to their own position. We will not seek to establish the truth on this issue positively by affirming something that the mind leads to in the same way it leads to the fallacies of our opponents.” (at-Tufi, 2005, Dar’ al-qawl al-qabih bi-t-tahsin wa-t-taqbih, ed. Ayman Mahmud Shihadah, Riyadh: Markaz al-Malik Faysal li-l-Buhuth wa-d-Dirasat al-Islamiyya, p. 163)

at-Tufi’s position clarifies certain theological topics might be better addressed through the indirect refutations offered by ilzam, particularly when engaging with those holding opposing views.

Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), the influential philosopher and Maliki jurist, offers a complementary perspective in his Fasl al-maqal that acknowledges the pragmatic necessity of different forms of argumentation based on the diverse cognitive capacities of different audiences:

طباع الناس متفاضلة في التصديق: فمنهم من يصدق بالبرهان، ومنهم من يصدق، بالأقاويل الجدلية تصديق صاحب البرهان بالبرهان، إذ ليس في طباعه أكثر من ذلك

“The natures of humans are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity”. (Ibn Rushd, 1983, Fasl al-maqal fi-ma bayna l-hikma wa-sh-shariʻa mina l-ittisal, ed. Muhammad ʻImara, Cairo: Dar al-Maʻarif, p. 31)

This perspective from Ibn Rushd suggests that the choice between demonstrative and dialectical methods should not only consider the subject matter but also the cognitive capacities and predispositions of the audience. It provides a pragmatic justification for the coexistence of multiple argumentative approaches within Islamic theological discourse, recognising that different individuals may require different paths to arrive at the same truths.

III. D. 2. The Promised Messiah’s^as approach

The Promised Messiah’s^as approach reflects a nuanced understanding of the distinction between ilzam and tahqiq or burhan, recognising their respective roles and strategic applications within theological debate.

Munshi Nabi Bakhsh narrates the Promised Messiah’s^as instructions regarding the use of these two types of responses:

حضرت مجھ کو عیسائیوں کے اعتراضات کے جوابات دو قِسم کے دیا کرتے تھے۔ الزامی اور تحقیقی۔ الزامی جوابات کے متعلق آپ کا ارشاد یہ ہوتا تھا کہ جب تم کسی جلسۂ عام میں پادریوں سے مباحثہ کرو تو ان کو ہمیشہ الزامی جواب دو۔ اس لئے کہ ان لوگوں کی نیّت نیک نہیں ہوتی۔ اور لوگوں کو گمراہ کرنا اور اسلام سے بد ظن کرنا اور آنحضرت صلّی اللہ علیہ وآلہٖ وسلّم پر حملہ کرنا مقصود ہوتا ہے۔ پس ایسے موقع پر الزامی جواب ان کے منہ کو بند کر دیتا ہے۔ اور عوام جو اس وقت محض تماشے کے طور پر جمع ہو جاتے ہیں۔ ایسے جواب سے متأثر ہو کر ان کے فریب میں نہیں آتے۔ لیکن اگر کسی ایسے شخص سے گفتگو کرو۔ جو اُن کے پھندے میں پھنس چکا ہو یا جس پر ایسا شبہ ہو کہ وہ اُس پر یہ ڈورے ڈال رہے ہیں تو اس کو ہمیشہ تحقیقی جواب پہلے دو۔ اور اس پر مقابلہ کر کے دکھاؤ کہ اسلام اور عیسائیت کی تعلیم میں کیا فرق ہے۔ ایسے لوگوں کو اگر الزامی جواب پہلے دیا جائے تو وہ یہ ٹھوکر کھا سکتے ہیں کہ حقیقی جواب کوئی نہیں۔

“The Promised Messiah^as used to provide me with two types of responses to the objections raised by Christians: dialectical (ilzami) and demonstrative (tahqiqi). Regarding the ilzami responses, he would instruct that when you are engaging in a public debate with Christian missionaries, always use the ilzami argument. This is because their intentions are not sincere; their aim is to mislead people, create doubts about Islam, and attack the Holy Prophet^sa. In such situations, the ilzami argument effectively silences them, and the general public, who often gather merely out of curiosity, are not influenced by their deception. However, if you are speaking with someone who has already fallen into their trap or whom you suspect they are trying to influence, always start with a tahqiqi argument. Show through reason and comparison the differences between the teachings of Islam and Christianity. If you start with an ilzami argument in such cases, they might mistakenly think that there is no real, substantive answer to their objections.” (Ya‘qub ‘Ali ‘Irfani, 2013, Hayat-e Ahmad, Rabwah: Nizarat-e Isha‘at, Vol. 1, pp. 412-413)

This narration highlights the Promised Messiah’s^as nuanced understanding of the strategic application of ilzam and tahqiq in different contexts. He recognised that while ilzami arguments could effectively counter insincere opponents in public settings, tahqiqi arguments, focusing on demonstrative reasoning, were more appropriate for engaging with individuals seeking genuine understanding.

In Barahin-e Ahmadiyya, the Promised Messiah^as writes:

شاید بعض صاحبوں کے دل میں اس کتاب کی نسبت یہ وسوسہ گزرے کہ جواب تک کتابیں مناظرات مذہبی میں تصنیف ہو چکی ہیں کیا وہ الزام اور افحام مخاصمین کے لئے کافی نہیں ہیں کہ اس کی حاجت ہے لہذا میں اس بات کو بخوبی منقوش خاطر کر دینا چاہتا ہوں جو اس کتاب اور ان کتابوں کے فوائد میں بڑا ہی فرق ہے وہ کتابیں خاص خاص فرقوں کے مقابلہ پر بنائی گئی ہیں اور ان کی وجوہات اور دلائل وہاں تک ہی محدود ہیں جو اس فرقہ خاص کے ملزم کرنے کے لئے کفایت کرتی ہیں اور گو وہ کتابیں کیسی ہی عمدہ اور لطیف ہوں مگر ان سے وہی خاص قوم فائدہ اٹھا سکتی ہے کہ جن کے مقابلہ پر وہ تالیف پائی ہیں لیکن یہ کتاب تمام فرقوں کے مقابلہ پر حقیت اسلام اور سچائی عقائد اسلام کی ثابت کرتی ہے اور عام تحقیقات سے حقانیت فرقان مجید کی بپایہ ثبوت پہنچاتی ہے اور ظاہر ہے کہ جو جو حقائق اور دقائق عام تحقیقات میں کھلتے ہیں خاص مباحثات میں انکشاف ان کا ہر گز ممکن نہیں کسی خاص قوم کے ساتھ جو شخص مناظرہ کرتا ہے اس کو ایسی حاجتیں کہاں پڑتی ہیں کہ جن امور کو اس قوم نے تسلیم کیا ہوا ہے ان کو بھی اپنی عمیق اور مستحکم تحقیقات سے ثابت کرے بلکہ خاص مباحثات میں اکثر الزامی جوابات سے کام نکالا جاتا ہے اور دلائل معقولہ کی طرف نہایت ہی کم توجہ ہوتی ہے اور خاص بحثوں کا کچھ مقتضاہی ایسا ہوتا ہے جو فلسفی طور پر تحقیقات کرنے کی حاجت نہیں پڑتی اور پوری دلائل کا تو ذکر ہی کیا ہے بستم حصہ دلائل عقلیہ کا بھی اندراج نہیں پاتا۔

“Some people may harbour doubts about this book and ask, ‘Are the books that are already written on religious subjects (munazarat) not sufficient to refute (ilzam) and silence (ifham) the critics? Why do we need another book?’ Let it be clear that this book is unlike any other in its effectiveness. All those books have been written in the context of a particular faith and their arguments are confined to refuting (ilzam) the specific beliefs of that faith. No matter how great or scholarly those books may be, they serve only the people to whom they have been addressed. This book, on the other hand, proves the divine origin of Islam and the superiority of the teachings of Islam over all faiths and establishes the authenticity of the Holy Quran through comprehensive demonstrations (tahqiqat). It is obvious that truths that unfold in such a manner can never be revealed through focussed arguments. When debating with the people of a particular faith, one does not need to provide in-depth and solid demonstrations (tahqiqat) regarding beliefs that they already hold;  instead, one relies primarily on dialectical (ilzami) answers, and rarely resorts to logic and reason (dala’il-e ma‘qula). By their very nature, such debates do not necessitate philosophical demonstrations (tahqiqat), let alone exhaustive reasoning. Only a fraction of rational arguments (dala’il-e ‘aqliyya) is employed in such debates.” (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Barahin-e Ahmadiyya: Part 1, in: Id., 2021, Ruhani Khaza’in, Farnham: Islam International Publications, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9)

The Promised Messiah’s^as approach demonstrates a nuanced understanding of ilzam and tahqiq, i.e., burhan. He writes:

اس بات کو کون نہیں جانتا کہ بحث مباحثہ اظہار حق کی غرض سے ہونا چاہئے یعنے اس نیت سے کہ اگر حق ظاہر ہو تو اسے قبول کرلیں مگر وہ شخص جو ایک بات کو اپنے لئے تو جائز رکھتا ہے لیکن اگر فریق مخالف کے کسی امر مسلم میں اس کے ہزار جز میں سے ایک جز بھی پائی جائے اور کیسی یہ خوبی سے پائی جائے تب بھی اس کو قبول نہیں کرتا ایسے شخص کی نیت ہرگز بخیر نہیں ہوتی اور جو وقت اس کے ساتھ بحث میں خرچ ہو وہ ناحق ضائع جاتا ہے پس کیا یہ ُ بری بات ہے کہ ایسے شخص کو سمجھایا جائے کہ بھائی جبکہ تو خود آپ ہی ایسی باتوں کو مانتا ہے کہ نہ صرف بالاتر از عقل بلکہ خلاف عقل بھی ہیں تو جو امور عقلِ محدود انسانی سے بالاتر ہیں اور ان کا ثبوت بھی تجھے دیا جاتا ہے۔ ان کے ماننے میں تجھے کیوں تامل ہے بلکہ تمام تر دینداری و پرہیزگاری تو اس میں ہے کہ اگر انسان ایک بات کو اپنی رائے میں صحیح سمجھتا ہے تو اسی نوع کی بات میں اپنے مخالف کے ساتھ منکرانہ جھگڑا نہ لے بیٹھے کہ یہ اوباشانہ طریق ہے جس میں فریقین کی تضیع اوقات ہے پھر پر ظاہر ہے کہ ایسا جھگڑا کس قدر برا اور خلاف طریق انصاف ہوگا کہ ایسی بات سے انکار کیا جائے کہ جو اپنے مسلّمات سے صدہا درجہ صاف اور پاک اور قدرت الٰہی میں داخل اور تاریخی طور پر ثبوت بھی اپنے ساتھ رکھتی ہو۔ بے شک ایسا نکما جھگڑا کرنے والا اپنا اور اپنے مخالف کا وقت عزیز کھونا چاہتا ہے جس کو الزامی جواب سے متنبہ کرنا اپنے حفظِ اوقات کے لئے فرض طریق مناظرہ ہے اور نیز چونکہ دنیا میں مختلف طبیعتوں کے آدمی ہیں بعض لوگ جو نادر الوجود ہیں وہ تحقیقی بات سن کر اپنی ضد چھوڑ دیتے ہیں اور اکثر عوام جو تحقیقی جواب سمجھنے کا مادہ ہی نہیں رکھتے یا بعض ان میں سے کچھ مادہ تو رکھتے ہیں مگر چاند پر خاک ڈالنا چاہتے ہیں اس لئے ان کا مونہہ الزامی جوابوں سے بند ہوتا ہے یہی وجہ ہے کہ الزامی طور پر چند مسلّمات آپ کے آپ کو سنائے گئے ورنہ اصل مدار جواب کا تو تحقیق پر ہی ہے۔

“Everyone knows that debates (bahth mubahatha) should be conducted with the intention of revealing the truth, meaning with the intention that if truth becomes manifest, one should accept it. However, a person who considers something permissible for himself, but if even a thousandth part of that same thing is found in an established matter of the opposing party, no matter how excellently it is found, still does not accept it – such a person’s intention is never good, and any time spent debating with him is wasted. So, is it not appropriate to explain to such a person, ‘Brother, when you yourself believe in such matters that are not only beyond reason but also contrary to reason, then why do you hesitate to accept those matters which are beyond limited human intellect and for which proof is also provided to you?’ In fact, true religiosity and piety lie in this: if a person considers something correct in his opinion, he should not engage in a contentious argument with his opponent over a similar matter, for this is a vulgar method that wastes the time of both parties. Moreover, it is evident how wrong and contrary to the principles of justice it would be to deny a matter that is hundreds of times clearer and purer than one’s own accepted beliefs, falls within divine power, and carries historical proof. Undoubtedly, such a futile arguer wishes to waste his own and his opponent’s precious time, and it is obligatory in the method of debate to alert him with a dialectical (ilzami) response to preserve one’s time. Furthermore, since there are people of different natures in the world – some rare individuals who abandon their stubbornness upon hearing a demonstrative (tahqiqi) argument, and many common people who either lack the capacity to understand tahqiqi responses or some who have some capacity but wish to cast dust on the moon [i.e., deny the obvious merit] – their mouths are shut with ilzami responses. This is why a few of your accepted beliefs were presented to you in an ilzami manner; otherwise, the main focus of the response shall be on demonstration (tahqiq).” (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Surma-e Chashm-e Arya, in: Id., 2021, Ruhani Khaza’in, Farnham: Islam International Publications, Vol. 2, pp. 130-131)

This passage reveals the Promised Messiah’s^as emphasis on establishing truth through demonstrative means (tahqiq) as the primary focus. He viewed ilzam as a secondary tool, best reserved for specific situations or types of opponents.

Hazrat Mirza Bashir Ahmad’s^ra narration in Sirat al-Mahdi further supports this view:

ڈاکٹر میر محمد اسماعیل صاحب نے مجھ سے بیان کیا کہ حضرت مولوی نور الدین صاحب خلیفہ اولؓ میں یہ ایک خاص بات تھی کہ معترض اور مخالف کو ایک یا دو جملوں میں بالکل ساکت کر دیتے تھے اور اکثر اوقات الزامی جواب دیتے تھے۔ لیکن حضرت مسیح موعود علیہ السلام کا یہ طریق تھا کہ جب کوئی اعتراض کرتا تو آپ ہمیشہ تفصیلی اور تحقیقی جواب دیا کرتے تھے اور کئی کئی پہلوؤں سے اس مسئلہ کو صاف کیا کرتے تھے۔ یہ مطلب نہ ہوتا تھا کہ معترض ساکت ہو جائے بلکہ یہ کہ کسی طرح حق اس کے ذہن نشین ہو جائے۔

“Dr. Mir Muhammad Isma‘il^[ra] related to me that Hadrat Mawlawi Nur ad-Din, the First Caliph^ra, had this special characteristic that he could silence an objector or opponent in just one or two sentences, and he often gave ilzami responses. However, the method of the Promised Messiah^as was that when someone raised an objection, he would always give a detailed and demonstrative (tahqiqi) response, clarifying the issue from multiple angles. His aim was not merely to silence the objector, but rather to ensure that the truth would somehow become firmly established in their mind.” (Mirza Bashir Ahmad, 2008, Sirat al-Mahdi, Rabwah: Nizarat-e Isha‘at, Vol. 2., p. 20)

This account, alongside his own writings, reinforces the Promised Messiah’s^as preference for detailed and demonstrative (tahqiqi) responses. This approach, aimed at fostering genuine understanding, aligns with the principles of burhan, which seeks to illuminate truth definitively. While acknowledging the occasional tactical necessity of ilzam, his emphasis remained firmly on demonstrative reasoning.

III. E. The legitimacy of ilzam in Islamic scholarship

While ilzam’s effectiveness in theological debate is evident, its legitimacy as a method of argumentation within the Islamic tradition has sometimes been questioned. Critics might argue that ilzam is inherently un-Islamic or intellectually dishonest, as it involves engaging with premises the arguer might not personally accept. This section will demonstrate that ilzam, far from being an unorthodox practice, is firmly rooted in established principles of Islamic jurisprudence and theological discourse.

Ibn ‘Aqil, in his discussion of permissible argumentative strategies, provides a framework for understanding the legitimacy of ilzam:

ولا يجوز أن يورد سؤالاً يتضمن إلزام خصمه ما لا يقول به؛ إلا ما تضمن إفسادا لمعنى العلة وهو الكس، أو إفساد ألفاظها وهو النقض. وكل سؤال كان للإفساد جاز أن يكون على أصل المستدل خاصة دون الملزم

“It is not permissible to pose a question that entails upon one’s opponent what one does not [oneself] hold to be true, except for what involves exposing a flaw in the meaning of the reasoning, which is [called] kasr, or exposing a flaw in its wording, which is [called] naqd. And every question aimed at refutation is permissible based on the principles of the one presenting the argument, particularly without [being binding] upon the one making the ilzam (mulzim).” (Ibn ‘Aqil, Kitab al-Jadal, ed. George Makdisi, p. 69, §323, in: Bulletin d’Études Orientales, 1967, Vol. 20, p. 136)

Ibn ‘Aqil emphasises that while arguments should generally be based on principles the arguer accepts, exceptions are made for refutation (kasr and naqd). This suggests that exposing inconsistencies in an opponent’s position, even using premises one does not personally endorse, is a legitimate tactic. This principle creates space for ilzam as an acceptable tool of refutation.

Al-Amidi, in his al-Ihkam, further clarifies this point:

قولهم: (هذا منكم لا يستقيم). قلنا: إنما ذكرنا ذلك بطريق الإلزام للخصم لكونه قائلا به

“[Regarding] their saying, ‘This [position] of yours is not sound,’ we said: ‘We only mentioned that by way of ilzam against the opponent because he is the one who asserted it.’” (al-Amidi, 1982, al-Ihkam fi usul al-ahkam, ed. ‘Abd ar-Razzaq ‘Afifi, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, Vol. 1, p. 89)

Al-Amidi’s statement highlights that ilzam is not about the arguer’s personal belief in the premises but about demonstrating the problematic implications of the opponent’s claims. This distinction underscores the intellectual honesty of ilzam: the debater is not required to subscribe to the premises they utilise for refutation.

This understanding is further supported by Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), who in his Taqrib outlines a fundamental principle of logic that underpins ilzam:

واعلم أن الخصم إذا اقر لك بالمقدمتين اللتين على الشروط التي قدمنا من الصحة وأنكر النتيجة فقد تناقض وسقط وبطل قوله

“Know that if an opponent acknowledges two premises that meet the conditions of validity we have set forth, yet denies the conclusion, he has contradicted himself, his argument has collapsed, and his statement is nullified.” (Ibn Hazm, ibid., p. 268)

This principle of using an opponent’s concessions to draw logical conclusions forms the basis of ilzam. Many scholars employed this technique in their theological discussions. Critics who dismiss this kind of argument fail to recognise the long-standing tradition of this logical method in Islamic discourse.

Al-Ghazali provides additional support for the legitimacy of ilzam. In al-Iqtisad fi l-i‘tiqad, he discusses various approaches to establishing an argument, stating:

اعلم أن مناهج الأدلة متشعبة […]. ولكنا في هذا الكتاب نحترز عن الطرق المتغلقة والمسالك الغامضة قصدا للايضاح وميلا إلى الإيجاز واجتنابا للتطويل. ونقتصر على ثلاثة مناهج: […] المنهج الثالث: أن لا نتعرض لثبوت دعوانا، بل ندعي إستحالة دعوى الخصم بأن نبين أنه مفض إلى المحال وما يفضي إلى المحال فهو محال لا محالة. […] فهذه ثلاث مناهج في الاستدلال جلية لا يتصور إنكار حصول العلم منها

“Know that the methods of proof ramify. […] In this book, however, we stay away from dead-end paths and obscure trails, aiming at clarity, inclining towards brevity, and avoiding long-windedness. We confine ourselves to three methods. […] The third method is that we do not directly establish our claim, but we claim that our opponent’s position is impossible by showing that since it leads to an impossibility, it is inevitably impossible. […] These are three clear methods of proof; to deny that through them knowledge is obtained is unimaginable.” (al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad fi l-i‘tiqad, ibid., p. 19)

Al-Ghazali’s third method aligns with the principles of ilzam. He argues for demonstrating the inherent impossibility of the opponent’s position by showing that it leads to absurd or untenable consequences. This approach, while effective, raises a crucial question regarding the legitimacy of ilzam: can one engage with potentially blasphemous or heretical statements without being accused of endorsing those views?

Islamic scholarship provides a clear answer: relaying or engaging with statements of disbelief does not constitute disbelief itself. This principle is succinctly expressed by the maxim:

حكاية الكفر ليس بكفر

“Narrating disbelief (kufr) is not [itself] disbelief.” (as-Suhayli, 1990, ar-Rawd al-unuf, ed. ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Wakil, Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, Vol. 5, p. 73)

This principle is supported by various scholars, including al-Qadi ‘Iyad (d. 544/1149) in his Shifa, who highlights the established practice of quoting statements of disbelief to refute them:

وقد حكى الله تعالى مقالات المفترين عليه، وعلى رسله، في كتابه على وجه الإنكار لقولهم، والتحذير من كفرهم، والوعيد عليه، والرد عليهم بما تلاه الله علينا في محكم كتابه.

وكذلك وقع من أمثاله في أحاديث النبي ﷺ الصحيحة على الوجوه المتقدمة، وأجمع السلف والخلف من أئمة الهدى على حكايات مقالات الكفرة والملحدين في كتبهم ومجالسهم، ليبينوها للناس، وينقضوا شبهها عليهم.

“And Allah the Almighty has narrated in His Book the statements of those who fabricate lies against Him and His messengers, in a manner of denouncing their words, warning against their disbelief, threatening them for it, and refuting them with what Allah has recited to us in His clear Book.

“Similarly, this occurred in authentic ahadith of the Prophet^sa in the aforementioned ways. The predecessors (salaf) and successors (khalaf) among the Imams of guidance have unanimously agreed on narrating the statements of disbelievers and atheists in their books and gatherings, in order to explain them to people and refute their misconceptions.” (al-Qadi ‘Iyad, 2013, ash-Shifa bi-ta‘rif huquq al-Mustafa, ed. ʻAbduh ʻAli Kushak, Dubai: Jaʼizat Dubayy ad-Duwaliyya li-l-Qurʼan al-Karim, p. 801)

Ibn Hazm, in Fisal, adds further weight to this principle:

وأما من كفر الناس بما تؤول إليه أقوالهم فخطأ؛ لأنه كذب على الخصم وتقويل له ما لم يقل به، وإن لزمه فلم يحصل على غير التناقض فقط، والتناقض ليس كفراً، بل قد أحسن إذ قد فر من الكفر

“As for those who declare people disbelievers based on the implications of their statements, this is a mistake. It amounts to lying about the opponent and attributing to them what they have not said. Even if it logically follows from their position, all that has been achieved is pointing out a contradiction, and contradiction alone is not disbelief. In fact, they have done well in fleeing from disbelief.” (Ibn Hazm, 2002, al-Fisal fi l-milal wa-l-ahwa’ an-nihal, ed. Dr. Yusuf al-Biqa‘i, Beirut: Dar Ihyaʼ at-Turath al-ʻArabi, Vol. 2, p. 233)

Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563), an important Hanafi jurist succinctly summarises the correct approach in his al-Bahr al-ra’iq:

والذي تحرر أنه لا يفتى بتكفير مسلم أمكن حمل كلامه على محمل حسن

“The established position is that a Muslim should not be declared a disbeliever if it is possible to interpret his words in a favourable way.” (Ibn Nujaym, 1997, al-Bahr ar-raʼiq sharh Kanz al-daqaʼiq, ed. Zakariyya ʻUmayrat, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Vol. 5, p. 210)

By drawing on these prominent scholars and established principles, we can see that ilzam is a legitimate tool within Islamic intellectual discourse. Its focus is not on endorsing falsehood, but on strategically exposing inconsistencies and prompting critical reflection through the skillful use of an opponent’s own premises.

IV. Ilzam‘s enduring relevance: Exposing inherent consequences

The concept of ilzam occupies a significant and, at times, paradoxical place within the landscape of Islamic intellectual history. While some scholars have expressed reservations about its use, often favouring demonstrative reasoning or emphasising its limitations, the pervasive presence of ilzam in their own works reveals its enduring relevance and strategic importance. Even within texts dedicated to alternative forms of argumentation, ilzam emerges as a powerful tool, employed to address specific challenges and to expose the inherent weaknesses in opposing viewpoints. This section explores this seeming contradiction, highlighting how the strategic value of ilzam often transcends theoretical preferences or methodological pronouncements.

IV. A. Ar-Razi’s complex relationship with ilzam

The case of Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi exemplifies the complex and nuanced relationship that Islamic scholars have had with ilzam. In the preface to his theological work Nihayat al-‘uqul, ar-Razi seems to distance himself from the use of ilzam, emphasising instead the importance of demonstrative reasoning based on “genuine evidence and definitive proofs.”

He states:

استنباط الأدلة الحقيقية، والبراهين اليقينية المفيدة للعلم الحقيقي، واليقين التام، لا الإلزامات التي منتهى المقصود من إيرادها مجرد التعجيز والإفحام

“Deriving genuine evidence and definitive proofs that lead to real knowledge and complete certainty, not [using] ilzamat which are only intended to refute and defeat [an opponent].” (Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, 2015, Nihayat al-‘uqul fi dirayat al-‘usul, ed. Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Latif Fawda, Beirut: Dar adh-Dhakha’ir, Vol. 1, p. 99)

This suggests a deliberate preference for constructive argumentation aimed at establishing the veracity of his own theological positions, rather than relying on ilzam solely to dismantle opposing views. However, a closer examination of the Nihaya reveals a different picture. Despite his stated preference for demonstrative proof, ar-Razi frequently employs ilzam within the very work where he seemingly rejects it.

Several instances highlight this apparent contradiction. For example, he utilises ilzam to demonstrate the absurdity of those who deny the reliability of sensible knowledge. (Ibid., p. 169)

He also employs ilzam specifically against the Sophists, challenging their scepticism regarding sense perception and knowledge. (Ibid., p. 173)

Additionally, ar-Razi uses ilzam to expose contradictions in his opponents’ arguments regarding rational inquiry (nazar). (Ibid., p. 187)

Moreover, he even employs ilzam to establish the first premise of his proof for the contingency of the world, explicitly acknowledging its use despite basing it on a philosophical theory (hylomorphism) that he himself rejects. (Ibid., pp. 350-351)

This discrepancy between ar-Razi’s stated intention and his actual practice underscores a non-negligible point about the nature of ilzam. Its persistent use, even by scholars like ar-Razi who championed demonstrative reasoning, reveals its enduring relevance within Islamic intellectual history. Ar-Razi’s own employment of ilzam suggests that certain ideas are best challenged by exposing their inherent contradictions, even if the arguer does not personally endorse the premises used. This highlights the unique value of ilzam as a tool for navigating the complexities of theological discourse, compelling engagement with the logical implications of any argument, no matter how deeply entrenched.

IV. B. Ilzam’s appeal beyond kalam: Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya

The enduring relevance of ilzam extends beyond the confines of kalam and its proponents, as evidenced by its utilisation by scholars critical of the kalam tradition itself.

Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), a prominent Hanbali scholar known for his critique of kalam, provides a notable example. While he does not explicitly use the term ilzam, his arguments often employ its underlying principles. While discussing the Christians’ use of evidence from previous prophets to validate their religion, he argues that their approach is self-defeating. He points out that if they accept the prophethood of earlier messengers, they must logically accept the prophethood of the Holy Prophet Muhammad^sa as well, which would invalidate their own religious claims.

Ibn Taymiyya says:

فكان صحة دليلهم يستلزم بطلان المدلول وفساد المدلول يستلزم فساد الدليل، فإن الدليل ملزوم للمدلول عليه وإذا تحقق الملزوم تحقق اللازم وإذا انتفى اللازم انتفى الملزوم فإذا ثبت الدليل ثبت المدلول عليه وإذا فسد المدلول عليه لزم فساد الدليل، فإن الباطل لا يقوم عليه دليل صحيح.

“Therefore, the validity of their evidence (dalil) necessitates the invalidity of what it indicates (madlul), and the unsoundness (fasad) of what it indicates necessitates the unsoundness of the evidence. This is because the evidence is antecedent (malzum) to what it indicates. When the antecedent is established, its consequence (lazim) is also established. Conversely, if the consequence is negated, the antecedent is negated as well. Hence, if the evidence is proven sound, what it indicates is also proven sound. And if what it indicates is found to be unsound, it necessarily follows that the evidence itself is unsound, for a false conclusion cannot be supported by sound evidence.” (Ibn Taymiyya, 1999, al-Jawab as-sahih li-man baddala din al-Masih, ed. Ali ibn Hasan ibn Nasir; ʻAbd al-ʻAziz ibn Ibrahim al-ʻAskar; Hamdan ibn Muhammad al-Hamdan, Riyadh: Dar al-ʻAsima, Vol. 2, p. 42)

Although Ibn Taymiyya does not explicitly mention ilzam, his argument here clearly utilises its principles. He demonstrates how accepting the Christians’ own premises (the validity of earlier prophets) leads to a conclusion (accepting Prophet Muhammad’s^sa prophethood) that contradicts their position. This implicit use of ilzam highlights its pervasiveness as a logical tool, even among those who might not explicitly endorse it.

In his work Minhaj as-sunna, Ibn Taymiyya engages in debate with the Shi‘a. He challenges them by drawing on premises that they themselves accept, compelling them to confront the logical consequences of their beliefs.

For example, in his critique of Imam ‘Ali^ra, Ibn Taymiyya presents an argument that some might perceive as disrespectful:

ثم يقال لهؤلاء الرافضة: لو قالت لكم النواصب: علي قد استحل دماء المسلمين: وقاتلهم بغير أمر الله ورسوله على رياسته. وقد قال النبي ﷺ: «سباب المسلم فسوق، وقتاله كفر». وقال: «لا ترجعوا بعدي كفارا يضرب بعضكم رقاب بعض» . فيكون علي كافرا لذلك – لم تكن حجتكم أقوى من حجتهم؛ لأن الأحاديث التي احتجوا بها صحيحة.

“It can be said to these Rafidis: If the Nasibis were to tell you that ‘Ali permitted the shedding of Muslim blood and fought them without the command of Allah and His Messenger, for the sake of his leadership – and the Prophet^sa said, ‘Insulting a Muslim is sinful, and fighting him is disbelief,’ and, ‘Do not revert to disbelief after me by striking one another’s necks’ – then this would make ‘Ali a disbeliever according to that. Your argument would not be stronger than theirs, as the hadith they rely on is authentic.” (Ibn Taymiyya, 1986, Minhaj as-sunna, ed. Muhammad Rashad Salim, Riyadh: Jami‘at al-Imam Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud al-Islamiyya, Vol. 4, pp. 499-500)

Ibn Taymiyya uses this argument not to declare ‘Ali^ra guilty of such accusations, but to demonstrate that the logic used by the Shi‘a to condemn the Companions^ra could be similarly turned against ‘Ali^ra. This ilzami approach forces the Shi‘a to either revise their stance on ‘Ali^ra or accept the same charges they levy against others. While some might see this as a form of disrespect towards ‘Ali^ra, it is important to understand that this was not Ibn Taymiyya’s intent. Rather, he was employing ilzam as a dialectical tool to expose inconsistencies in his opponents’ arguments without endorsing the conclusions himself.

Similarly, Ibn Taymiyya’s eminent student and scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) employs ilzam in his critique of rationalist scriptural interpretation in his as-Sawa’iq al-mursala. He argues that they contradict themselves by claiming to uphold the literal meaning of the Quran and hadith while resorting to allegorical interpretations (ta’wil) that negate divine attributes. (Ibn al-Qayyim, 2020, as-Sawaʻiq al-mursala ʻala l-jahmiyya wa-l-muʻattila, ed. Husayn ibn ʻUkasha ibn Ramadan, Vol. 1, p. 453)

He highlights the contradiction inherent in their claiming the literal meaning is inconsequential while resorting to ta’wil to uphold God’s attributes. Finally, he criticises their reliance on tafwid – leaving interpretation to God – arguing it undermines revelation itself. (Ibid., p. 454)

This demonstrates Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s use of ilzam to expose contradictions within a school of thought.

The fact that ilzam was a significant aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological method is further evidenced in the abridgment of his above-mentioned original work, Ibn al-Mawsili’s (d. 774/1373) Mukhtasar as-Sawa’iq al-mursala:

إذ يحسن في الاحتجاج على المنكر وإلزامه من الخطاب الداحض لحجته ما لا يحسن في سياق غيره، ولا ينكر هذا إلا غبي

“What is appropriate when arguing with an opponent [i.e., the idol-worshippers] and compelling him (wa-ilzumahu) through a discourse that refutes his argument is totally inappropriate in a different context. Only a complete ignoramus will deny this.” (Ibn al-Mawsili, Mukhtasar as-Sawaʻiq al-mursala ʻala l-jahmiyya wa-l-muʻattila, ed. Sayyid Ibrahim, Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, p. 432)

This suggests that Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological method involved not only a familiarity with kalam and its tools, like ilzam, but also a degree of acceptance of the underlying rationalistic methodology.

Another example of Ibn al-Qayyim’s use of ilzam is found in his Shifa’ al-‘alil, where he discusses predestination and human will. In this context, he engages with the Ash‘ari viewpoint, represented by those who argue in favour of predestination (jabr), using ilzam to highlight the contradictions within their reasoning. He points out that if actions were inevitable due to a combination of power and motivation, then the same reasoning would apply to Allah, making Him compelled in His actions as well:

ثم نقول: لو صحت هذه الحجة لزم أن يكون الرب سبحانه مضطرا على أفعاله، مجبورا عليها بعين ما ذكرت من مقدماتها؛ فإنه سبحانه يفعل بقدرته ومشيئته، وما ذكرت من وجوب الفعل عند القدرة والداعي، وامتناعه عند عدمهما؛ ثابت في حقه سبحانه.

وقد اعترف أصحابك بهذا الإلزام، وأجابوا عنه بما لا يجدي شيئا.

“Then we say: If this argument were sound, it would necessitate that the Lord Himself be compelled to perform His actions. For He acts by His power and will, and the necessity of actions in the presence of power and motivation, and their impossibility in their absence, is also established in relation to Him.

“Your companions have admitted to this ilzam and responded to it with answers that are of no avail.” (Ibn al-Qayyim, 2019, Shifaʼ al-ʻalil fi masaʼil al-qadaʼ wa-l-qadar wa-l-hikma wa-l-taʻlil, ed. Zahir ibn Salim Balfaqih, Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, Vol. 1, p. 458):

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya finds the Ash‘ari view on jabr inherently contradictory. He argues that their logic, if applied consistently, leads to the absurd conclusion that Allah Himself is subject to external compulsion. By employing ilzam, he aims to demonstrate that the Ash‘aris must either abandon their stance on jabr or accept its untenable consequences – a reality he believes undermines their entire theological framework.

These examples, along with the one concerning the allegorical interpretations of scripture, demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim utilises ilzam to expose contradictions within particular theological frameworks and to challenge rationalist scriptural hermeneutics.

V. Ilzam in Christian-Muslim Polemics

The use of ilzam in theological debates extends far beyond the time of the Promised Messiah^as. Examining how earlier Muslim scholars employed this method, particularly when engaging with Christian doctrines, provides a crucial historical context for understanding the legitimacy and strategic significance of ilzam. This section will explore two prominent examples from classical Islamic scholarship: Imam al-Qurtubi (d. 671/1273) and Najm ad-Din at-Tufi (d. 716/1316).

V. A. Al-Qurtubi’s ilzami critique

Imam al-Qurtubi, the renowned Quranic commentator and Maliki jurist, provides multiple examples of ilzam in his I‘lam. While the primary aim of this work is to refute Christian doctrines, al-Qurtubi occasionally employs language that may seem provocative or challenging.

For example, al-Qurtubi critiques the Christian belief in the divinity of Jesus^as by highlighting his human limitations. He argues:

وإذا علم عيسى نفسه متغوطا بائلا ومصفوعا ومتوجا بالشوك ومصلوبا في حشبة ومسمرة يداه ورجلاه فيها فينبغي لله تعالى أن يعلم نفسه كذلك

“And when Jesus knows himself as one who defecates, urinates, is slapped, crowned with thorns, and crucified on wood with his hands and feet nailed to it, it would necessitate that God knows Himself likewise”. (al-Qurtubi, 1980, al-Iʻlam bi-ma fi din an-Nasara mina l-fasad wa-l-awham wa-izhar mahasin din al-Islam wa-l-ithbat nubuwwat Nabiyyina Muhammad, ed. Ahmad Hijazi as-Saqqa, Cairo: Dar at-Turath al-ʻArabi, p. 141)

Here, al-Qurtubi seeks to expose what he perceives as a contradiction in Christian theology. He challenges the idea that a being who experiences such bodily functions and humiliations could possess divine qualities. This, however, is not meant as an insult to Jesus^as, whom Muslims revere as a prophet, but rather as a critique of the attribution of divinity to any human being.

al-Qurtubi continues by presenting a logical dilemma for Christians regarding the incarnation:

فهم بين أمرين إما أن يقولوا إن جسده المتغوط البائل إله أو هو شطر إله فإن قالوا إن جسده إله فكفى شناعة وهجانة إله بائل متغوط مصلوب

“They are left between two choices: either they say that his defecating, urinating body is God, or that he is half-God. If they say his body is God, what a disgrace and shame – a defecating, urinating, crucified god!” (Ibid., pp. 141-142)

This vivid imagery is part of al-Qurtubi’s broader attempt to demonstrate that Christian claims about Jesus’^as divinity are, in his view, inherently self-contradictory. However, al-Qurtubi’s tone and choice of words can be seen as provocative, particularly when taken out of the context of scholarly debate.

A key aspect of his critique revolves around the crucifixion narrative. Al-Qurtubi challenges Christians by pointing out the supposed contradiction of attributing divine qualities to someone who was subjected to such suffering and humiliation:

فلقد أدرك لاهوته من المذلة والإهانة والنخز والموت ما أدرك ناسوته […] فيلزمكم على هذا أن تعبدوا إلها ذليلا مهانا ينخز ويموت وكفى بهذا خزيا وفضيحة

“His divine nature would have experienced the same humiliation, degradation, piercing, and death as his human nature […]. This would require you (to worship a humiliated, degraded god who is pierced and dies – and this alone is enough of a disgrace and scandal.” (Ibid., p. 142)

Again, al-Qurtubi emphasises the difficulty in reconciling the Christian belief in Jesus’ divinity with the crucifixion. His intent is to illustrate the contradiction, not to demean Jesus^as. Al-Qurtubi’s words may seem harsh, but they are directed toward the theological claim of divinity rather than the person of Jesus^as himself.

Al-Qurtubi dismisses the doctrine of the unity of divine knowledge with Jesus in rather drastic terms as inherently flawed:

وهذا كله لازم على هذا المذهب السخيف الفاسد الضعيف

“All of this follows necessarily (lazim) from this imbecilic, corrupt, and weak doctrine.” (Ibid., p. 141)

He concludes the chapter by commenting on the nature of the Christian community:

وقد خرجنا مع هؤلاء الجهال بخالقهم المستهزئين بأديانهم إلى حد الإكثار

“We have gone to great lengths with these people who are ignorant of their Creator and who mock their own religions.” (Ibid., p. 142)

Al-Qurtubi’s ilzam, while primarily aimed at exposing contradictions in Christian theology, also demonstrates the complex nature of this dialectical approach. Through ilzam, he seeks to lead his opponents to reconsider their beliefs. However, the provocative language and striking imagery, particularly when critiquing core tenets like Jesus’ divinity, can easily be misinterpreted when divorced from its scholarly context. This highlights the importance of understanding tone and intent in the analysis of ilzam.

However, al-Qurtubi’s application of ilzam extends beyond his critique of Jesus’ divinity. He engages with biblical narratives that involve other prophetic figures, sometimes addressing highly sensitive content. Take, for instance, his discussion of the story of Lot and his daughters from Genesis 34:

من ذلك ما حكوا في السفر الأول عن لوط أنه طلع من صاغار فسكن الجبل هو وابنتاه معه فجلس في مغار هو وابنتاه فقالت الكبرى للصغرى قد شاخ أبونا وليس على الأرض رجل يدخل علينا نسقي أبانا الخمر ونضطجع معه في مضطجعه ففعلنا وحملتا منه بولدين موآب وعمون.

هذا لوط من رسل الله الأكرمين أوقعه الله في فاحشة كما يوقع الأرذلين ثم خلد ذكرها في الآخرين

“Among those [narratives] is what they recounted in the first book [of the Torah] about Lot, that he went up from Zoar and dwelt in the mountain, he and his two daughters with him, and he sat in a cave, he and his two daughters. Then the elder said to the younger, ‘Our father is old, and there is no man on earth to come in to us. Let us make our father drink wine, and we will lie with him, that we may preserve seed of our father.’ So they did, and they conceived by him two sons, Moab and Ben-Ammi.

“This is Lot, one of the most honoured Messengers of Allah, whom Allah caused to fall into an immoral act, as He causes the most wicked to fall, [and] then He perpetuated its mention among later generations.” (Ibid., p. 196)

Al-Qurtubi’s citation of the incestuous narrative of Lot and his daughters exemplifies the challenges and risks inherent in using ilzam in religious polemics. While such arguments are effective in refuting misrepresentations of divine will, the use of strong language and controversial imagery can risk misinterpretation or accusations of blasphemy when taken out of their intended historical and theological context.

V. B. At-Tufi’s ilzami commentary

Najm ad-Din at-Tufi (d. 716/1316), a Hanbali jurist, theologian and scholar of legal theory, offers another example of ilzam in his at-Ta‘liq ‘ala l-Anajil al-arba‘a (“Commentary on the Four Gospels”). In his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, at-Tufi engages with the text through an ilzami lens, drawing on internal inconsistencies to question certain Christian beliefs.

He writes:

وهذا حين الشروع في التعليق على إنجيل لوقا.

فمن ذلك: قوله في مقدمته في صفة یحیی بن زکریا، لما بشره به جبریل: (یکون عظيما قدام الرب، لا يشرب خمرا، ولا مسكرا، ويمتلئ من روح القدس). وفي آخر المقدمة: (وامتلأ زكريا أبوه؛ من روح القدس). قلت: ففي هذا الكلام شناعة، ونقض على النصارى، أما الشناعة: فإن ملك الرب وصف ابن زكريا بأنه لا يشرب الخمر على؛ جهة المدح له. والأناجيل تضمنت أن المسيح ملأ الكأس وقال: (هذا دمي، وما عدت أشرب عصير الكرمة حتى أصل إلى ملكوت السماوات)، أو معنى هذا الكلام، وقد سبق وصرح فيه بأنه شرب الخمر، وهذا يدل على أن يحيى بن زكريا أفضل من المسيح؛ لأن دین المسیح ترد الذنیا وشهواتها، وقد زهد یحیی منها؛ فیما لم یزهد فیه المسیح، وهم لا يقولون بهذا ولا نحن، وإنما ألزمناهم إلزاما.

وأما النقض: فإن الإنجیل قد تضمن أن ابن زکریا، امتلأ من روح القدس في بطن أمه، وهذا أبلغ من المسيح؛ لأن الأناجيل تضمنت؛ أن روح القدس، إنما جاء المسيح لما اعتمد من يوخنا المعمداني، وكذلك تضمن الإنجیل امتلاء زکریا من روح القدس، فيلزم النصارى أن يكون زكريا وابنه إلهين، أو ابنين للإله؛ لمشاركتهما المسيح في روح القدس، ولا فرق بينهما وبين المسيح في ذلك، إلا أن المسیح ولد لغیر بشر، وظهر علی یدیه من الآیات ما ظهر، ولیس ذلك بفرق مؤثر من حيث الأبوة والبنوة، بل من حيث ظهور المعجزات التي يختص الله بها من يشاء من خلقة.

“Now it is time to begin the Critical Commentary on the Gospel of Luke.

“Among other things, there is (Luke’s) statement in the prologue (of his Gospel) with regard to the description of John, son of Zechariah, when Gabriel brought (Zechariah) the glad tidings of his birth: ‘He shall be great before the Lord, drink neither wine nor intoxicating drink, and he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit,’ and in the end of the prologue: ‘And his father Zechariah was filled with the Holy Spirit.’ I say: This statement contains a disgrace and a refutation of the Christians. As for the disgrace, the angel of the Lord describes the son of Zechariah as someone who would not drink wine, in a manner of praising him, while the Gospels include the statement that Christ filled his cup and said: ‘This is my blood, and I shall not drink the juice of the vine again until I reach the Kingdom of Heaven’ or something to this effect, which has already been mentioned and in which he explicitly declared that he drank wine. This indicates that John, son of Zechariah, was more virtuous than Christ, because the religion of Christ consists of renouncing the world and its desires. Consequently, John would have abstained from it in instances where Christ did not abstain from it. Yet they do not claim this, nor do we, but we have indeed cornered them with this ilzam.

“As for the refutation, the Gospel includes the statement that the son of Zechariah became filled with the Holy Spirit in the womb of his mother, which is more impressive than the case of Christ, since the Gospels relate that the Holy Spirit only came to Christ when he was baptised by John the Baptist. Likewise, the Gospel includes (the account of) Zechariah’s becoming filled with the Holy Spirit. Thus, the Christians are compelled to accept that Zechariah and his son should be two gods or two sons of God, due to their sharing the Holy Spirit with Christ, without any difference between the two and Christ therein, except that Christ was born without a human (father) and that at his hands there appeared whatever signs did appear.” (Najm ad-Din at-Tufi, 2016, at-Taʻliq ʻala l-Anajil al-arbaʻa wa-kutub al-Anbiyaʼ al-ithna ʻashar wa-t-Tawra, ed. Dr. Musa ibn Muhammad Al Hajad az-Zahrani, Doha: Muʼassasat Waʻy li-l-Abhath wa-d-Dirasat, pp. 156-157)

At-Tufi employs the dialectical device of ilzam to highlight perceived inconsistencies in the portrayal of the relationship of John the Baptist, Jesus, and Zechariah with the Holy Spirit in the Gospel. His arguments, if taken at face value without contextualisation, could be perceived as shockingly blasphemous by those unfamiliar with this dialectical device. He makes the bold assertion that John the Baptist must be regarded as more virtuous than Jesus due to his abstinence from wine. This claim, if taken at face value, would be highly offensive to both Christians and Muslims. At-Tufi employs the Gospel’s account of the Holy Spirit descending upon John the Baptist and Zechariah to argue that they, like Jesus, could be considered divine or “sons of God,” a proposition that is even more controversial. If such statements are misconstrued as reflecting the author’s genuine beliefs rather than as dialectical devices, they could be perceived as egregious blasphemy against Jesus^as and other prophets. At-Tufi explicitly states that he is employing ilzam as a dialectical strategy. The intention is to prompt Christians to confront these implications.

Interestingly, a similar ilzami point regarding the relative virtue of Jesus and John the Baptist due to abstinence from wine was raised centuries later by the Promised Messiah^as. He stated:

لیکن مسیح کی راستبازی اپنے زمانہ میں دوسرے راستبازوں سے بڑھ کر ثابت نہیں ہوتی بلکہ یحییٰ نبی کو اس پر ایک فضیلت ہے کیونکہ وہ شراب نہیں پیتا تھا

“[B]ut there is no evidence to suggest that the Masih [Messiah] excelled other righteous ones in his time. In fact, it can be supposed that in one respect Yahya [John the Baptist] possesses a superiority over him in that he did not drink alcohol”. (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Dafi‘ al-bala’, in: Id., 2021, Ruhani Khaza’in, Farnham: Islam International Publications, Vol. 18, p. 220)

However, when the Promised Messiah^as employed this argument, he faced accusations of disbelief (kufr).

Both the examples of al-Qurtubi and at-Tufi demonstrate that the use of ilzam in Christian-Muslim polemics has a long history within Islamic scholarship. They utilised this technique to expose what they perceived as logical inconsistencies and theological contradictions within Christian doctrines, prompting a re-evaluation of these beliefs. Their approaches serve as historical precedents for the Promised Messiah’s^as own use of ilzam when engaging with Christian theology, as we will explore in subsequent sections.

V. C. Al-Kayranawi’s ilzami discourse

Rahmat Allah al-Kayranawi’s (d. 1306/1889) Izhar al-haqq (“Manifestation of Truth”), a comprehensive refutation of Christian doctrines, exemplifies the strategic use of ilzam in addressing polemical claims against Islam.

Right at the outset, al-Kayranawi explicitly states his methodology:

إني إذا أطلقت الكلام في هذا الكتاب في موضع من المواضع فهو منقول عن كتب علماء (البروتستنت) بطريق الإلزام والجدل، فإن رآه الناظر مخالفاً لمذهب أهل الإسلام فلا يقع في الشك

“When I make a statement in this book in any place, it is quoted from the books of Protestant scholars by way of ilzam and dialectic (jadal). If the reader finds it contradictory to the doctrine of Islam, they should not fall into doubt.” (al-Kayranawi, 1989, Izhar al-haqq, ed. Muhammad Ahmad Muhammad ʻAbd al-Qadir Khalil Malakawi, Riyadh: Riʼasat Idarat al-Buhuth al-ʻIlmiyya wa-l-Iftaʼ wa-d-Daʻwa wa-l-Irshad, Vol. 1, p. 9)

He acknowledges the sensitive nature of using ilzam, especially when dealing with the beliefs of others, and provides a justification for his approach:

وإني وإن كنت أستكره أن أنقل ذنوب الأنبياء والكفريات المفتريات عن كتبهم ولو إلزاما، ولا أعتقد في حضرات الأنبياء إنصافهم بهذه الذنوب والكفريات حاشا وكلا. لكني لما رأيت أن علماء بروتستنت أطالوا ألسنتهم إطالة فاحشة في حق محمد ﷺ في الأمور الخفيفة، وجعلوا الخردلة جبلاً لتغليط العوام الغير الواقفين على كتبهم، وكان مظنة وقوع السذج في الاشتباه بتمويهاتهم الباطلة، نقلت بعضها إلزاما، ، وأتبرأ عن اعتقادها بألف لسان وليس نقلها إلا كنقل كلمات الكفر، ونقل الكفر ليس بكفر

“Although I am reluctant to relay the alleged sins of prophets and fabricated acts of disbelief from their books, even as a form of ilzam, and I do not believe that the exalted ranks of the prophets are characterised by these sins and acts of disbelief – God forbid. However, when I saw that Protestant scholars have greatly exaggerated their criticism of Muhammad^sa in minor matters, making mountains out of molehills to mislead the common people who are unfamiliar with their books, and there was a possibility that naive individuals might fall into confusion due to their false embellishments, I relayed some of these claims as a form of ilzam, and I disavow believing in them with a thousand tongues, and relaying them is nothing more than transmitting words of disbelief (kufr), and transmitting kufr is not kufr.” (Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 1214-1215)

This justification for employing ilzam – to counter the polemical attacks and distortions propagated by certain Christian scholars – highlights the strategic nature of this method. Al-Kayranawi is not using ilzam to simply mock or denigrate Christian beliefs, but to expose their internal inconsistencies and to defend the honour of the Prophet Muhammad^sa.

The Promised Messiah^as provides a similar justification for his use of ilzam when responding to Christian critics. He states:

بالآخر ہم لکھتے ہیں کہ ہمیں پادریوں کے یسوع اور اس کے چال چلن سے کچھ غرض نہ تھی۔ انہوں نے نا حق ہمارے نبی ﷺ کوگالیاں دے کر ہمیں آمادہ کیا کہ اُن کے یسوع کا تھوڑا سا حال ان پر ظاہر کریں

“Finally, we write that we had no concern with the Jesus of the priests and his conduct. They unjustly provoked us by abusing our Prophet^sa, compelling us to reveal to them a little about their Jesus.” (Anjam-e Atham, Ruhani Khaza’in, Vol. 11, p. 292, footnote)

This explanation mirrors al-Kayranawi’s justification. Both felt compelled to respond to the polemical attacks against Islam and its Prophet^sa, strategically using the opponent’s own beliefs and narratives to expose their inconsistencies and to defend the truth.

Al-Kayranawi reinforces this point, emphasising that his use of ilzam does not imply endorsement of the potentially offensive views he cites:

أعاذنا الله من أمثال هذه الاعتقادات السوء في حق الأنبياء عليهم السلام. ولا يؤاخذني على ما نقلت هذه المزخرفات على سبيل الإلزام والله ثم بالله لا أعتقد في حق الأنبياء هذه الكذبات وهم بريئون منها

“May Allah protect us from such evil beliefs about the Prophets^as. And let no blame be placed upon me for what I have cited of these fabrications – for I have done so only as a matter of ilzam. By God, I swear by God, that I do not believe these lies about the prophets. They are innocent of such claims.” (al-Kayranawi, ibid., Vol. 3, p. 838)

Throughout Izhar al-haqq, al-Kayranawi employs ilzam to address various aspects of Christian theology. For example, he questions the motives of Jesus’^as disciples, analyses the accounts of Jesus’^as miracles, and explores the concept of God’s regret in the Bible.

He also writes:

وههنا خدشة يجوز لنا أن نوردها إلزاماً فقط. وهي أنه لما ثبتت الندامة في حق الله وثبت أنه ندم على خلق الإنسان وعلى جعل شاول ملكاً فيجوز أن يكون قد ندم على إرسال المسيح عليه السلام، بعد ما أظهر دعوى الألوهية على ما هو زعم أهل التثليث، لأن هذه الدعوى من البشر الحادث أعظمُ جرماً من عدم إطاعة شاول أمر الرب، وكما لم يكن الله واقفاً على أن شاول يعصي أمره فكذا يجوز أن يكون واقفاً على أن المسيح عليه السلام يدعي الألوهية، وإنما قلت هذا إلزاماً فقط لأنا لا نعتقد بفضل الله ندامة الله ولا ادعاء المسيح عليه السلام الألوهية، بل عندنا ساحة الألوهية وكذا ساحة نبوة المسيح عليه السلام صافيتان عن قمامة هذه الكدورات والمنكرات

“Here arises a point that we are permitted to raise – as a matter of ilzam only – namely that since regret has been established as an attribute of God, and it is proven that He regretted creating mankind and making Saul king, it is conceivable that He may have also regretted sending the Messiah^as, especially after the Messiah, as the Trinitarians claim, publicly declared his divinity. For such a claim from a mere mortal is a graver sin than Saul’s disobedience to God’s command. And just as God was not aware that Saul would disobey His command, it is likewise conceivable that He was not aware that the Messiah^as would claim divinity. However, I have only raised this point as a matter of ilzam. By God’s grace, we do not believe in attributing regret to God, nor do we believe in the Messiah’s claim of divinity. Rather, we maintain that both God’s divine majesty and the Messiah’s^as prophethood are pure and unsullied by such repugnant and corrupt notions.” (Ibid., p. 670)

It is significant that al-Kairanawi uses the phrase “peace be upon him” (‘alayhi s-salam) even when referring to the Christian conception of Jesus, despite considering their portrayal a theological distortion.

In each instance, he clarifies that his arguments are presented as ilzam and do not reflect his personal beliefs. He emphasises this point after discussing the worldly ambitions of Jesus’^as disciples:

وهذا التقرير على سبيل الإلزام لا الاعتقاد كما صرحت به مراراً. فكما أن هذا الاحتمال في حق عيسى وحواريه الحقة عليهم السلام ساقط فكذلك احتمالهم في حق أصحاب محمد ﷺ ساقط

“I have presented this analysis as a matter of ilzam, not as a reflection of my personal beliefs, as I have repeatedly emphasised. Just as the accusation of worldly motives is baseless when applied to Jesus and his true disciples, peace be upon them, so too is it unfounded concerning the companions of Muhammad^sa.” (Ibid., p. 925)

He makes a similar clarification after examining the biblical accounts of Jesus’^as miracles:

فعلم من هذه الأقوال أنه لم تصدر معجزة إحياء الميت عن المسيح قط […]

(تنبيه) ما قلت في إنكار معجزات الأحياء على سبيل الإلزام كما علمت في أول الكتاب

“From these verses, it is clear that Jesus did not perform the miracle of resurrecting the dead […].

“(Note): My denial of the miracles of resurrection is presented as a matter of ilzam, as explained at the beginning of the book.” (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 221-222)

Al-Kayranawi’s consistent emphasis on distinguishing between employing an argument for strategic purposes and genuinely holding those beliefs underscores the ethical dimension of ilzam. It allows the debater to engage with and expose weaknesses in the opponent’s position without personally endorsing the premises or conclusions employed in the process.

One of al-Kayranawi’s most striking uses of ilzam comes in his discussion of the women who travelled with Jesus^as and his disciples. He poses a series of pointed questions, employing language that could be considered provocative, even defamatory, by those who lack a deep understanding of ilzam as a legitimate tool within Islamic scholarly tradition:

وكذا اختلاط النساء الشواب الأجنبيات مع الرجال الشبان، آفة شديدة لا ترجى العصمة، سيما إذا كان الرجل شاباً عزباً شارب الخمر، والمرأة فاحشة محبوبة وهي تدور معه وتخدمه بمالها ونفسها […] فكيف أجاز لها بهذه الأمور، حتى اعترض عليه الفريسي، وكيف يتصور أن هذه الأمور لم تكن من مقتضى الشهوات النفسانية، وكيف غفر خطاياها وذنوبها على هذا الفعل. أهذه الأمور هي اللائقة لذات الله العادل المقدس.

“Similarly, the mingling of young, strange women with young men is a severe affliction from which there is no hope of protection from sin, especially if the man is a young bachelor who drinks wine and the woman is a notorious beloved who revolves around him and serves him with her wealth and herself. […] So how could he permit her to do these things, to the point that the Pharisee objected to him? How can one imagine that these actions were not driven by carnal desires? How could he forgive her sins and transgressions for this act? Are these actions befitting of the essence of the just and holy God?” (Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 1343-1345)

Here, al-Kayranawi uses loaded terms like fahisha (notorious or scandalous woman) and shahawat nafsaniyya (carnal desires), insinuating a potential for impropriety in Jesus’^as interactions with women. By framing these questions in the context of Biblical narratives about sinful behaviour and juxtaposing them with the concept of a “Just and Holy God,” he creates a stark contrast designed to expose a perceived flaw within the Christian understanding of Jesus^as.

He further emphasises the potential for scandal by quoting an unnamed critic who employs even more inflammatory language:

وقد كانت وقتئذ بغياً مباحة، فهل يليق الآن بأحد مطارنة النصارى، إذا كان ضيفاً في بيت أحد معارفه، أن يأذن لقبيحة فاحشة في أن تغسل رجليه بمحضر ملأ من الناس، من غير أن تبدي أمارة التوبة من قبل، لا سراً ولا جهراً

“And at that time, fornication was permissible, so is it fitting now for one of the Christian bishops, if he were a guest in the house of one of his acquaintances, to allow an ugly, scandalous woman to wash his feet in the presence of a gathering of people, without her showing any sign of repentance beforehand, neither secretly nor openly?” (Ibid., p. 1345)

This critic, voicing a perspective that al-Kayranawi seeks to refute, uses harsh terms like baghyan mubahatan (permissible fornication) and qabiha fahisha (ugly, scandalous woman), explicitly linking Jesus’^as actions to sexual immorality. This further underscores the potential for misinterpreting al-Kayranawi’s ilzami critique, especially if his words are taken out of context.

al-Kayranawi concludes this section by distancing himself from these accusations:

واعلم أني ما كتبت في هذا الأمر الخامس، كتبته إلزاماً، وإلا فإني أتبرأ من أمثال هذه التقريرات. ولا اعتقد أمراً منها في حق عيسى عليه السلام، ولا في حق حواريه الأمجاد، كما صرحت في مقدمة الكتاب، ومواضع متعددة.

“Know that what I have written in this [chapter on the] fifth matter, I have written as ilzam, otherwise, I disassociate myself from such statements. I do not believe any of them regarding Jesus^as nor regarding his glorious disciples, as I have stated in the introduction of the book and in multiple places.” (Ibid., p. 1348)

This passage, along with his earlier explanations, demonstrates the importance of understanding ilzam within its proper context. While his use of ilzam might seem provocative to some, al-Kayranawi’s primary aim is to challenge the internal logic and theological coherence of certain Christian doctrines, not to engage in personal attacks or to endorse the negative interpretations he presents.

This approach, while controversial, aligns with the broader purpose of ilzam as a tool for prompting critical reflection and challenging deeply held assumptions. Al-Kayranawi’s Izhar al-haqq serves as a compelling case study, illustrating both the potential effectiveness and the potential pitfalls of employing ilzam in interreligious polemics.

VI. Addressing accusations of blasphemy: The Promised Messiah’s^as usage of ilzam

One of the aims of this paper is to address the accusations of blasphemy levelled against the Promised Messiah^as for his use of ilzam. These accusations often stem from misunderstandings of the method’s purpose within Islamic theological discourse and a failure to consider the specific context of his writings. Critics unfamiliar with the nuances of ilzam may misinterpret its strategic deployment of an opponent’s premises as an endorsement of those premises, leading to charges of insincerity or heresy. Furthermore, ilzam’s focus on exposing the logical consequences of an opponent’s views, which can sometimes involve highlighting potentially offensive or uncomfortable implications, can be misconstrued as a personal attack or an intention to denigrate.

The Promised Messiah^as himself anticipated and addressed such potential misunderstandings. His employment of ilzam, like that of other scholars throughout Islamic history, was a strategic tool for engaging with opposing viewpoints and defending Islamic beliefs, not an act of disrespect or an endorsement of heretical ideas. He viewed his use of ilzam, particularly in the context of his interactions with Christian missionaries, as part of his divinely ordained mission:

وسماني بإسم يناسب إسم قوم أرسلت لإفحامهم وإلزامهم وهم قوم المتنصرين، الذين علوا في الأرض، واستضعفوا أهل الحق، وزينوا الباطل ليدحضوا به الحق، وكانوا قومًا مسرفين

“And He [i.e., Allah] named me with a name that suits the people I was sent to silence (ifham) and refute (ilzam): They are the Christianised people (al-mutanassirin), who have become haughty on earth, weakened the people of truth, and adorned falsehood to refute the truth with it, and they have been a people of excesses.” (A’ina-e kamalat-e Islam, Ruhani Khaza’in, Vol. 5, p. 367)

This statement clarifies that the Promised Messiah’s^as objective in using ilzam was to fulfil his divinely appointed task of engaging with those who opposed or distorted religious truth. His intention was not to insult or denigrate Christians but to address their theological arguments and expose what he perceived as their misrepresentations.

Furthermore, he explicitly clarified that his critiques were not directed towards the person of Jesus^as, whom he revered as a prophet of God, but rather towards specific theological interpretations promoted by Christian missionaries:

اور یاد رہے کہ یہ ہماری رائے اس یسوع کی نسبت ہے جس نے خدائی کا دعویٰ کیا اور پہلے نبیوں کو چور اور بٹمار کہا اور خاتم الانبیاء صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کی نسبت بجز اس کے کچھ نہیں کہا کہ میرے بعد جھوٹے نبی آئیں گے۔ ایسے یسوع کا قرآن میں کہیں ذکر نہیں۔

“And remember, this is our opinion regarding that Jesus who claimed divinity, called the earlier prophets thieves and robbers, and said nothing about the Seal of Prophets^sa except that false prophets would come after him. There is no mention of such a Jesus in the Quran.” (Anjam-e Atham, Rahani Khaza’in, Vol. 11, p. 13)

He further explains:

ہم نے اپنی کلام میں ہر جگہ عیسائیوں کا فرضی یسوع مراد لیا ہے اور خدا تعالی کا ایک عاجز بندہ عیسی ابن مریم جو نبی تھا جس کا ذکر قرآن میں ہے وہ ہمارے درشت مخاطبات میں ہر گز مراد نہیں اور یہ طریق ہم نے برابر چالیس برس تک پادری صاحبوں کی گالیاں سن کر اختیار کیا ہے۔ […] در حقیقت پادری صاحبان تحقیر اور توہین اور گالیاں دینے میں اول نمبر پر ہیں۔ ہمارے پاس ایسے پادریوں کی کتابوں کا ایک ذخیرہ ہے جنہوں نے اپنی عبارات کو صدہا گالیوں سے بھر دیا ہے جس مولوی کی خواہش ہو وہ آکر دیکھ لیوے۔

“So, I am referring to this fictitious Yasu‘ of the Christians in my writing in every instance. In my harsh rebukes, I am not at all referring to Jesus, son of Mary, a humble servant of God and Prophet who is mentioned in the Holy Quran. I have adopted this course after constantly listening to the invectives of the Christian clergymen for forty years. […] [T]he Christian missionaries are, in fact, at the forefront of reviling, disparaging, and insulting [the Holy Prophet^sa]. I have a whole stockpile of books of such missionaries who have filled their writings with hundreds of invectives. Any maulawi who so desires, may come and see.” (Nurul-Quran, no. 2, Ruhani Khaza’in, Vol. 9, p. 375)

These passages clearly demonstrate that the Promised Messiah^as differentiated between the person of Jesus^as and the theological interpretations he was critiquing. Moreover, he explains that his “harsh rebukes” – expressed through ilzam – were a direct response to the insults and abuse directed at the Prophet Muhammad^sa by Christian missionaries. This important context often gets overlooked in accusations of blasphemy.

Further emphasising this distinction, the Promised Messiah^as explicitly states:

هذا ما كتبناه من الأناجيل على سبيل الإلزام. وإنا نكرم المسيح، ونعلم أنه كان تقيًّا ومن الأنبياء الكرام

“This is what we have written from the Gospels by way of ilzam. And we honour the Messiah, and we know that he was righteous and among the noble prophets.” (al-Balagh, Ruhani Khaza’in, Vol. 13, p. 451, footnote)

This statement again reinforces that his use of ilzam was a methodological approach to theological debate, distinct from his actual beliefs and deep respect for Jesus^as as a prophet of God.

Accusations of blasphemy against the Promised Messiah^as arise from:

1. Misinterpreting purpose of ilzam: Critics fail to recognise that the goal of ilzam is to expose logical inconsistencies, not to insult or denigrate.
2. Taking arguments out of context: Ilzam arguments, particularly when employing loaded language or challenging sensitive beliefs, can be easily misconstrued when divorced from their original context.
3. Confusing the use of an opponent’s premises with agreement: In ilzam, the arguer adopts the opponent’s premises for the sake of argument, not as an endorsement of their truth. Critics often fail to recognise this distinction. Earlier scholars faced similar misunderstandings, highlighting the recurring nature of these misinterpretations.

The Promised Messiah’s^as own explanations, along with a proper understanding of the principles and purpose of ilzam, make it clear that his use of this technique was a legitimate form of theological debate, not an act of blasphemy.

VII. Conclusion

This paper has explored the art of ilzam within Islamic intellectual history, focusing on its strategic deployment in the writings of the Promised Messiah, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad^as. By examining the historical and philosophical roots of argumentum ex concessis, the Islamic scholarly tradition of ilzam, and the Promised Messiah’s^as own explanations and applications of this method, we have illuminated the nuances of this often-misunderstood dialectical technique. His writings demonstrate a deep understanding of the power of ilzām to expose inconsistencies, challenge assumptions, and compel critical reflection, particularly when engaging with polemical claims against Islam. His strategic and nuanced approach, coupled with his explicit disclaimers regarding potentially offensive material presented as ilzam, distinguishes him from those who employ ilzam merely for dialectical point-scoring. The accusations of blasphemy levelled against him, therefore, stem not from a legitimate critique of his methods but from a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of ilzam and its established place within the broader tradition of Islamic intellectual discourse. By situating his work within this historical and theological context, we can appreciate the Promised Messiah’s^as skillful deployment of ilzam as a vital tool in his efforts to defend Islam, clarify its teachings, and promote reasoned dialogue in a world often marked by religious polemics.