Introduction
The Quran is considered by Muslims to be the final and universal law revealed by an All-Knowing God, which has been perfectly preserved and remains unchanged since its revelation to Prophet Muhammad (sa). Yet, whilst maintaining this belief, the majority of Muslim scholars throughout the ages have accepted that certain verses in the Quran were completely cancelled and replaced by others. They also believed that certain verses were revealed to the Prophet (sa) but are not included in the Quran we have today. The number of such “abrogated” verses varies drastically, but the higher end of these counts reaches into the hundreds and as much as 8% of the entire Quran.[1] Perhaps most striking is the claim that one single verse (the “Sword Verse”) abrogated a total of 124 verses in one clean strike.[2]
The doctrine of abrogation (naskh), which gradually became a genre in its own right in the eighth century during the era of the tabi‘un (successors of the Companions), is one of the most contentious topics within the Quranic sciences. Scholars disagree on most aspects of the theory: the very definition of naskh, the methods of its application, and whether the theory is even valid in the context of the Quran. A minority of scholars even rejected this doctrine altogether, asserting that any perceived contradiction between two verses of the Quran can, and should, be explained and reconciled.
Early evidence suggests that the Companions of Prophet Muhammad (sa) did not use the term naskh in the rigid, technical sense that later scholars developed – which is how most Muslims understand it today. Their usage was very fluid and figurative, and did not always connote complete cancellation. Over time, however, as the genre developed and tight technical definitions were formed, a dramatic inflation in the number of supposedly “abrogated” verses occurred. Three types of Quranic abrogation were eventually formalised: the verse is present in the Quran but its ruling has been abrogated and replaced; both the verse and its ruling have been abrogated and are not present in the Quran; and finally, the verse is not present in the Quran, but its ruling remains operative.
The implications of this theory cannot be ignored. If parts of the Quran were permanently cancelled, in what sense can it be deemed perfectly preserved, eternally valid and universal? What is to be made of certain passages that were meant to be a part of the Quran but are not, irrespective of whether it was just the text of the verse, or both text and ruling, that were left out? Narrations of this nature suggest that roughly 10% of the Quran could have been lost.[3] For a believer in a preserved scripture, revealed by an All-Knowing God, such implications raise serious theological problems.
Such challenges form the basis of this study. The historical evolution of the doctrine of abrogation, from its early usage to its later technical expansion and formalisation, is traced. The three types of abrogation are examined, after which a reconciliation and explanation of the five remaining “abrogated” verses as recognised by Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) in his al-Fawz al-Kabir is presented in light of Ahmadiyya scholarship. Each pairing of “abrogated” and “abrogating” verses is independently discussed. The perceived count of abrogation has thus been brought down to zero, thereby rejecting the application of the abrogation theory to the Quran.
Development of the naskh phenomenon
According to commentators of the Quran, the sanction of abrogation can be found in four verses.[4] The term naskh itself, however, only appears twice. The first instance is found in Surah al-Baqarah (2:107), which is widely accepted to mean: “whatever verse We replace (nansakh) or cause to be forgotten, We bring a better or the like to it.”[5] In the second instance, yansakh is understood to mean cancel, annul or remove, as seen in the verse: “We never sent any messenger or prophet before thee, but that Satan cast into his fancy, when he was fancying; but God annuls (yansakh) what Satan casts.”[6]
While the Companions of Prophet Muhammad (sa) are reported to have discussed and even disagreed on the abrogation of specific verses, references to them in formal naskh literature are infrequent.[7] It was in the eighth century, during the era of the tabi‘un, that it emerged as a genre of its own. Frequently cited figures include Nakha‘i (d. 712), Mujahid ibn Jabr (d. 722), Sha‘bi (d. 722), al-Dahhak ibn Muzahim (d. 723), al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 732), Qatada (d. 736), and Muqatil ibn Sulayman (d. 767), who often disagreed with one another. The earliest treatises on abrogation were by scholars such as Qatada, Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (d. 742), al-Harith ibn Abd al-Rahman (d.747), Ata al-Khurasani (d. 757), Muqatil, and Abd al-Rahman ibn Zayd (d. 798). Eventually, well-established standard texts were produced, most notably Kitab al-nasikh wa al-mansukh fi al-Quran al-karim by al-Nahhas (d. 949), al-Nasikh wa al-mansukh by Hibat Allah ibn Salama (d. 1020), and al-Nasikh wa al-mansukh by Ibn al-Ata‘iqi (d. 1308).[8]
As will be explored, the Companions’ usage of this term was in a broad, fluid sense; however, as the genre developed through the aforementioned works, scholars further tightened its definitions. Al-Nahhas defined naskh as “removal or elimination”, while Ibn Salama described it as the “raising or removal (raf‘) of something” because the abrogating verse removes the legal content (hukm) of the abrogated one. When defining, Al Fadali, the modern editor of Ibn al-Ata‘iqi, cites al-Layth (d. 791) and al-Farra’ (d. 822), both of whom defined naskh as the abandonment, removal or cancellation of the legal force of an earlier verse by a later one.[9]
Over time, three different modes of abrogation were formed: legal abrogation (naskh al-hukm dun al-tilawa), legal-textual abrogation (naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawa) and textual abrogation (naskh al-tilawa dun al-hukm).[10] The scholarly definitions cited above align with these three modes, and these will be explored later in the article.
What the Companions meant: Figurative vs actual abrogation
The semantic gap between how the Companions used the term “abrogated” and the technical definitions later generations formulated and used is a frequent source of confusion among scholars and lay Muslims alike. The Companions were speaking in an era before formal legal canonisations and specific technical definitions. They used the term in a fluid, often figurative sense rather than in the absolute sense adopted by later scholars. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) highlights this:
“The general meaning of the righteous predecessors when using the words ‘abrogating’ and ‘abrogated’ […] sometimes the removal of the general, absolute and outward meaning or otherwise, whether by specification, restriction, interpreting an absolute as limited, or by explanation and clarification. Even then, they would refer to it as exceptional and conditional.”[11]
Likewise, Shah Wali Allah explains in al-Fawz al-Kabir that the Companions and tabi‘un used the word abrogation in its grammatical sense – meaning, the “removal of one thing by another” – rather than the technical definition used by later scholars. According to this early understanding, abrogation simply referred to the removal of certain qualities of one verse by another. This broad definition encompassed a wide range of scenarios, including the introduction of a specific restriction to a general ruling and the replacement of a preceding law (shari‘a) or pre-Islamic pagan customs. Because the subject was viewed so broadly, Shah Wali Allah notes that while some commentators counted five hundred abrogated verses, if one thinks deeply according to this early methodology, such verses are actually “countless”, as the scope is so vast.[12]
Therefore, early Muslims often labelled a verse as “abrogated” if there was any sort of change to the original rule, even if the change was partial or exceptional.[13] These various types of partial abrogation eventually became identified by more specific technical terms, such as “specification” (takhsis), “restriction” (taqyid), “explanation” (tafsir), “clarification” (tabyin), “exceptional” (istithna’) and “conditional” (shart). In these instances, the previous rule was not cancelled in its entirety, but rather adjusted to account for a new situation.[14]
This subtle difference can be better understood by making a distinction between “actual” and “figurative” abrogation, as articulated by Ibn Aqilah al-Makki (d. 1737):
“Regarding specification and clarification, I say that this is a type of figurative abrogation, as abrogation is the lifting of the original ruling and this specification and clarification in the verses are mentioned as exceptions. Indeed, it is referred to as ‘abrogation’ because it lifts the general ruling; otherwise it is not truly abrogation.”[15]
Ibn Abbas (d. 687) would often use the term “abrogation” in its limited, partial sense. This is corroborated by several classical authorities. Al-Shatibi (d. 1388) notes that, “Makki said that Ibn Abbas would mention several things in the Quran for which an exception was made and he would say: ‘It is abrogated.’” Similarly, Al-Sakhawi (d. 1497) writes, “In our view, the terms abrogation, specification, and exception occurred after the time of Ibn Abbas, and Ibn Abbas would refer to all of that as abrogation.” Al-Qurtubi (d. 1273) mentions, “The predecessors would intend specification by the word abrogation, figuratively and metaphorically.”[16]
Therefore, while the concept of naskh was present from the earliest period, its precise technical definition and sharp distinctions only crystallised much later. For the Companions, the term served a figurative and metaphoric function rather than a formal juristic one in the absolute sense.
Inflation in the number of ‘abrogated’ verses: Jurists and commentators
Between the eighth and eleventh centuries, the number of verses that were considered to have been abrogated increased rapidly. This growth is evidenced by the evolving counts provided by major authorities: al-Zuhri identified approximately 42 instances, al-Nahhas cited 138, and Ibn Salama seems to have reached an upper limit of 238 – nearly half of which he attributed to being abrogated by the “Sword Verse.”[17]
Two major factors contributed to this inflation. First, the doctrine of abrogation may have been invoked after the death of Prophet Muhammad (sa) to reconcile apparent discrepancies that developed between the Quran and the maturing schools of legal thought (fiqh). Second, and more importantly, was the “expansion of the semantic range of the term naskh to include phenomena that did not originally fall within its scope.”[18] The jurists and commentators differed on the scope of naskh. Naskh usuli (of the jurists) was used strictly to mean the termination of one legal ruling and its replacement, whereas naskh tafsiri (of the commentators) also included partial abrogations, such as specification and exception (as mentioned above).[19]
Thus, this redefinition of the technical term by the commentators brought large numbers of verses within the scope of abrogation. By indexing every instance of figurative “change” as a formal case of abrogation, the number skyrocketed. In this way, the Companions’ broad, figurative and partial usage was formalised, and their oral habit was turned into expansive catalogues.
This historical trajectory directly connects with the “maximalist” commentators on one side with those who sought to whittle the list of abrogated verses down. By applying stricter juristic criteria and separating figurative “change” from absolute abrogation, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505) famously reduced the count to twenty, offering a reconciliation for most abrogated verses in his al-Itqan fi Ulum al-Quran. Shah Wali Allah further refined this to just five instances in al-Fawz al-Kabir fi Usul al-Tafsir.
Having established how the scope of abrogation as a definition was expanded, we can now examine the three technical modes of abrogation that eventually formed and were recognised by the authorities.
The three types of abrogation
Scholars have identified three main types of abrogation:
1. Legal abrogation (naskh al-hukm dun al-tilawa): of the ruling but not the text
2. Legal-textual abrogation (naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawa): of both the ruling and the text
3. Textual abrogation (naskh al-tilawa dun al-hukm): of the text but not the ruling
While there are other debates, such as whether abrogation in Surah al-Baqarah (2:107) can refer to the abrogation of previous religious law (shari‘a), or whether the sunnah can abrogate the Quran, this article will focus only on the supposed abrogation within the Quran itself. Even though Hadith narrations are largely the source for these claims, the focus will remain on the Quranic text and rulings.
Legal abrogation: Ruling but not text
The first type is known as “legal abrogation.” The technical term for this is naskh al-hukm dun al-tilawa, which translates to “abrogation of the ruling, but not the text.” This means that although the verse’s text is found in the Quran, the law or ruling it contains is supposedly no longer in effect and has been replaced by another verse. This category accounts for the largest part of the abrogation theory, with most “abrogated” verses falling under it. The other two types are much rarer.
Early sources indicate that this was the first type of abrogation to be formulated to explain instances in which scholars perceived two Quranic verses as in direct contradiction and irreconcilable.[20] To solve this problem, one verse was declared to be “abrogated” by the other. John Burton uses the word “perceived,” which is key, as it makes the process extremely subjective.[21] This is evident in the degree of disagreement regarding the number of abrogated. Louay Fatoohi argues that this type is actually the fruit of misunderstanding the Quranic text – essentially a misinterpretation of verses that scholars wrongly perceived as “contradictions.”[22]
Examples of this type of abrogation are many. For instance, it is said that the verse (58:13) requiring charity to be given before meeting the Holy Prophet (sa) was abrogated by the next verse, which provided an exemption to the supposed commandment. The key point is that, although both verses are present in the Quran, the legal ruling of the former has been replaced by that of the latter. Another example is the night prayer in Surah al-Muzzammil; initially, the Prophet (sa) was told to pray for a long part of the night, but this was supposedly abrogated by the last verse of the same chapter, which lightened this requirement. Other examples include verses concerning the rights of widowed women and the number of enemies Muslims should fight (both will be discussed at length later). The biggest and most shocking example is the “Verse of the Sword,” which is claimed to have abrogated the peaceable verses revealed before it, such as those on forgiving enemies and the absence of compulsion in religion. The total number of abrogated verses by this one verse is given as 124.[23]
Critics argue that legal abrogation poses significant theological and methodological challenges. Primarily, that it undermines the doctrine of Quranic preservation. They argue that it is logically inconsistent with divine wisdom to suggest that Allah would reveal a command, completely cancel and replace it, and yet keep the nullified text within the universal book intended for all time. From this perspective, declaring a verse abrogated is often viewed as a “cop-out” used to bypass the more difficult task of reconciling the text.[24]
Methodologically, this mode has been criticised for being inherently subjective. As John Burton mentions, every alleged instance of legal abrogation depends entirely on how a scholar perceives the interpretation and meaning of a verse and the relationship between two verses. Fatoohi asserts that abrogation is effectively the “fruit of misunderstanding the Quranic text” – a systemic misinterpretation of verses that scholars wrongly labelled as “contradictions.” In every case of such abrogation, he states, a more plausible and convincing interpretation exists that allows both verses to remain operative.[25]
Furthermore, it is argued that the reliance on Hadith literature to establish abrogation is fundamentally flawed. Extra-Quranic literature is not reliable enough on its own to serve as the primary lens for interpreting the Quran, says Fatoohi. For those who take this view, relying on narrations often leads to “manipulating” the Quranic text to fit a hadith. Burton observes that the Quran itself does not endorse a general “theory” of abrogation. The theory was later developed by scholars to reconcile maturing schools of legal thought (fiqh) with their scriptural sources. Consequently, there is no solid foundation to suggest that abrogation is a principle of any prominence within the Quranic text.[26]
Legal-textual abrogation: Both ruling and text
The second type is “legal-textual abrogation.” The technical term is naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawa, which means that both the legal injunction and the text itself have been abrogated. In other words, neither the law nor the verse is found in the Quran as we have it today. This mode was devised by scholars to explain the problematic existence of “missing verses” – reports found in the Hadith literature that claim certain words or verses were once a part of the Quran.
We find out about such supposed verses only through the Hadith. One example is the incident of Bir Ma‘una, where a verse was reportedly recited, but not included in the final Quranic text.[27] Another is the famous “Son of Adam” passage: “If the son of Adam possessed a valley of gold, he would want another. Nothing fills the soul of the son of Adam but dust […].”[28] Similarly, it is reported that a verse requiring ten sucklings to establish a mahram relationship (rendering marriage between two parties forbidden) once existed but was subsequently abrogated by a five-suckling ruling. For the ten-suckling verse, therefore, both the text and the legal injunction were supposedly removed and thus abrogated. Interestingly, the five-suckling verse falls under textual abrogation, where the text was removed but the ruling remains in effect.[29]
Critics argue that the implications of this type of abrogation are extremely severe, as it directly challenges the completeness of the Quranic mushaf. The mushaf we possess was ordered and structured by Prophet Muhammad (sa) and then compiled under the directive of Hazrat Uthman (ra); to suggest that entire passages are “missing” is to claim that the mushaf does not contain the entirety of God’s revelation. It has been pointed out that this mode was essentially a scholarly device to explain Hadith reports that mention verses not found in the Quran. However, this creates a theological crisis: if a chapter like al-Ahzab purportedly lost over 200 verses, as some narrations claim, the historical indifference to such a massive loss is impossible to reconcile with the key belief that the Quran is preserved by Allah Himself.[30]
Furthermore, as mentioned, the reliance on extra-Quranic literature to interpret the Quran in this manner is methodologically flawed. For this, the hadith relied on represents a collection of often contradictory reports, as mentioned by Fatoohi: “Not only are completely contradictory views expressed by different individuals, but we find contradictory statements attributed to the same person.”[31]
Moreover, the suggestion that any Quranic material was lost due to human error is historically unrealistic. The Quran was the primary material for Muslim worship, requiring perfectly accurate recitation in every daily prayer. The memorisation of the entire Quran was also a widely practised habit. Also, the rapid spread of Islam across diverse regions made it impossible for anyone to alter or omit verses without detection. Ultimately, the existence of a single, universally accepted mushaf, accepted by Sunnis and Shias alike, serves as definitive evidence of the Quran’s complete preservation from its very inception.[32]
Ultimately, the acceptance of this mode forces a choice: either the mushaf is an unreliable record of the Quran, or the Hadith literature pertaining to this is an unreliable record of history.[33] John Burton argues that this mode of abrogation was introduced merely to rationalise the exclusion of certain verses and quell uncomfortable questions. For those who uphold the perfect preservation of the Quran, this mode of abrogation must be rejected as an attempt to harmonise unreliable reports with a divine, preserved text.
Textual abrogation: Text but not ruling
The third type of abrogation is “textual abrogation,” which is naskh al-tilawa dun al-hukm. This means “abrogation of the text but not the ruling.” It refers to a situation in which the text/writing of a verse is absent from the Quran, yet the legal ruling it contained remains operative. Like the previous category, we only know about these instances through certain Hadith.
The most famous example of this is the claim regarding stoning as a punishment for adultery. While the Quran explicitly prescribes a hundred lashes (24:3), certain narrations suggest a “Stoning Verse” once existed, and its ruling remains in force even though the text was removed. The second example involves the rules of suckling (rida‘a), as mentioned earlier. Hadith reports suggest that initially, ten sucklings were required to establish a mahram relationship (rendering marriage between two parties forbidden), which was later abrogated and replaced by a verse which mentioned five sucklings. The ten-suckling verse, being both missing from the text and inoperative in law, falls under the previous category of legal-textual abrogation. However, the five-suckling verse is placed in this category, as the ruling is still followed by some schools of law, despite the verse not being in the Quranic mushaf. A final example is found in the verse concerning the expiation of breaking an oath. Some reports claim that a missing word – mutatabi‘at (consecutively) – was once part of the text, requiring the three expiational fasts to be kept in a row.
The critique of textual abrogation rests on the same theological and methodological foundations as the previous modes, specifically regarding the reliance on extra-Quranic literature to interpret and explain the Quran, as well as the doctrine of complete Quranic preservation. However, as Fatoohi points out, a severe logical problem arises when this mode is compared to legal abrogation. Scholars who accept both categories fail to provide a convincing explanation for a glaring contradiction: why would God allow the text of an inoperative ruling to remain in the mushaf (as in legal abrogation), yet remove the text of a ruling that remains operative (textual abrogation)? There is no rational basis for why a law intended to be followed would have its scriptural evidence erased while a law that is abrogated remains in the Quran.[34]
Furthermore, the inclusion of these specific cases under the banner of abrogation highlights sheer confusion. Aside from the “stoning verse,” which is the only instance claimed to actually replace a Quranic ruling, the other two examples explain or clarify existing laws rather than abrogate them. This excludes them from the standard definition of naskh, which requires the replacement of one ruling by another. Ultimately, these reports are no more reliable than the narrations pertaining to legal-textual abrogation mentioned earlier.
Ahmadiyya stance on abrogation
While the view that the Quran is free from actual abrogation has historically been a minority position, it is not without significant precedent. Abu Muslim al-Isfahani (d. 934) was a tenth-century commentator who rejected the doctrine of abrogation in the Quran. In more recent times, reformists such as Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Muhammad Ghazali (d. 1996) also challenged this. Within this intellectual lineage, the Ahmadiyya scholarship represents a thorough rejection of the doctrine, moving beyond purely theoretical critique to presenting practical reconciliations of all such verses in the Quran.
The founder of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), framed the issue around the perfect preservation of the Quran. He maintained that as the final and perfect law, the Quran is immutable:
“And we have complete confidence in the fact that Holy Quran is the last divine book, and that not an iota or dot can be added or detracted from its laws, limits, commandments and orders. Now, there is no revelation or inspiration from Allah that can alter, change or abrogate any command of the Holy Quran.”[35]
Likewise, he mentions that any form of abrogation or addition to the Quran and its injunctions would falsify it:
“The truth is that the Quran cannot be truly abrogated (haqiqi naskh) or added to (haqiqi ziyadat) because this would falsify it.”[36]
As discussed, haqiqi naskh (true abrogation) here implies actual abrogation as opposed to partial or figurative abrogation, which in reality is not abrogation in the true sense.
The first Caliph of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen (d. 1914), approached the problem through the lens of historical evidence, or rather the absence of it. He noted that the doctrine of abrogation lacked any clear scriptural or early historical basis. He observed that neither Prophet Muhammad (sa) nor the first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr (ra) and Umar (ra), “ever stated anything that supports the idea that [abrogated] verses are part of the Quran.” He stated: “Up to now, I have not seen any verse that is abrogated and yet remains within the Quran.”[37]
From a historiographical perspective, this maintains that the technical categories of naskh were later scholarly constructs superimposed on and back-projected onto a text originally understood as fully operative.
Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen (ra) also mentions an incident from his time as a student of knowledge in Medina. He sought to deepen his understanding of the Quran by memorising the “abrogated” verses. For this, he purchased a book that listed nearly 600 abrogated verses, intending to memorise them. However, he found himself unable to agree with the author’s broad claims of such abrogation. His search for a more refined understanding led him to Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti’s al-Itqan fi Ulum al-Quran, which reduced the count of abrogated verses to approximately twenty. The relief of finding this was so immense that he described the discovery as if he had “become a king.”
Continuing this scholarly investigation, he eventually reached Shah Wali Allah’s al-Fawz al-Kabir, where the list was narrowed further to just five instances. Ultimately, Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen (ra) was able to find reconciliations for even these final cases within classical works of tafasir such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s al-Tafsir al-Kabir. Thus, according to his research, the count of abrogation in the Quran was nil. He concluded that the inflation of the theory was largely a result of the human limitation of scholars; upon encountering verses they struggled to reconcile, they often resorted to declaring them abrogated rather than striving to uncover their deeper meanings.[38]
This stance of no abrogation was further refined by the second Caliph, Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad (d. 1965), who emphasised the necessity of rejecting abrogation. He argued that belief in abrogation is intellectually stifling; if a believer suspects a verse might be “cancelled,” they lose the incentive to engage in tadabbur (deep reflection) in order to reconcile the verses. He stated: “When I read the different discussions about naskh in various commentaries, I do not find even one verse that is abrogated.”[39]
He recounted the insight of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (as), noting that once a person believes there are abrogated verses in the Quran, it not only stops him from pondering over the reconciliatory meanings but also from acting upon the verse, as later he may find out it was abrogated:
“I fully remember the words of the Promised Messiah (as), [Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad], where he said that when someone is convinced that there are certain verses in the Quran that are abrogated, then why would he ponder and meditate over it or endeavour to act according to its commandments? He would say, ‘Why should I waste my time pondering over such a book that has abrogated verses? It is possible that the verse I reflect upon may later turn out to be abrogated.’ But the person who states that this entire text is valid and every iota of it is meant to be acted upon will try to understand it, and this way the Quran will become the means of progress for his spiritual understanding.”[40]
Thus, the Quran is viewed as a perfectly preserved book in which every verse remains legally valid and operative, and from which no verse has been omitted.
Reconciling the five verses: A case study in Quranic preservation
To demonstrate the shift from a minimal list of five verses to a total count of zero, the specific pairings that Shah Wali Allah identified as the remaining instances of naskh will be used as case studies and examined in light of Ahmadiyya literature. These verses represent the most difficult challenges for commentators, where rulings appear to be most directly in conflict. The verses in question are as follows:
1. Will and inheritance (Surah al-Baqarah, Ch.2: V.181 by Surah an-Nisa, Ch.4: V.12)
2. Rights of a widow (Surah al-Baqarah Ch.2: V.241 by V.235)
3. Fighting fewer enemies (Surah al-Anfal Ch.8: V.66 with V.67)
4. Marriages of the Prophet (Surah al-Ahzab Ch.33: V.53 with V.51)
5. Charity before meeting the Prophet (Surah al-Mujadalah, Ch.58: V.13 with V.14)
(Additionally, the shift in the night prayer requirement in Surah al-Muzzammil, Ch.73: V.3 and V.21 has been mentioned by Shah Wali Allah. He states that while the ta‘keed [strict emphasis] of the command was abrogated, its status as a highly recommended act [mustahabb] remains fully operative, therefore not constituting actual abrogation.[41])
1. Will and inheritance (Surah al-Baqarah, Ch.2: V.181 by Surah an-Nisa, Ch.4: V.12)
The first instance of perceived abrogation involves the “bequest verse” in Surah al-Baqarah and the detailed verse of inheritance in Surah an-Nisa:
“It is prescribed for you, when death comes to any one of you, if he leave much wealth, that he make a will to parents and near relatives to act with fairness; it is an obligation on those who fear God.” (2:181)
“Allah commands you concerning your children: a male shall have as much as the share of two females; but if there be females only, numbering more than two, then they shall have two-thirds of what the deceased leaves; and if there be one, she shall have the half. And his parents shall have each of them a sixth of the inheritance, if he have a child; but if he have no child and his parents be his heirs, then his mother shall have a third; and if he have brothers and sisters, then his mother shall have a sixth, after the payment of any bequests he may have bequeathed or of debt. Your fathers and your children, you know not which of them is nearest to you in benefit. This fixing of portions is from Allah. Surely, Allah is All-Knowing, Wise.” (4:12)
Those who believe this to be a case of abrogation assert that because Surah an-Nisa provides a strict, mandatory list of who gets what in inheritance, the earlier instruction to “make a will” became null and void – i.e. abrogated. However, Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad (ra) explains that these verses are not contradictory but rather serve different, complementary functions.
One primary function of the bequest verse is to serve as a preventative measure against family quarrels and disputes. By making a manifest will, a person makes it undeniably clear in it that their estate should be distributed strictly according to the Islamic law of inheritance. This prevents relatives or friends from coming forward, claiming they were “promised” a specific asset, thereby acting as a shield for the prescribed portions of inheritance.[42]
Also, while the fixed portions in Surah an-Nisa are mandatory, the Islamic framework allows for up to one-third of one’s wealth to be allocated to any one of the deceased’s choosing (provided they are not already fixed heirs, and will not use the wealth against Islam). This creates a necessary “expansion” to the law, which allows for people not directly included in the inheritance verse to be left a portion, such as:
- Distant but deserving relatives: It allows a person to provide for relatives who may be distant in lineage but “close in love” or in financial need.
- Non-Muslim relatives: Since the fixed inheritance law applies to Muslim heirs, this verse allows a person to provide for non-Muslim parents or children, ensuring the wealth will not be used against Islam.
- Grandchildren: Often, if a person’s own child has passed away, the grandchildren may fall out of the primary fixed shares. A will ensures these grandchildren are not left destitute.[43]
The verses before and after the bequest verse discuss warfare. Historically, those who partook in battle at the time were generally young men who were often at an age where they either did not have children or their children were too young to practically manage the estate if left behind. In such a situation, the primary concern would naturally be parents and close relatives. This explains why children were not the primary focus of the specific instruction, whereas they became a part of the general inheritance law.[44]
Some scholars have argued that the hadith “There is no bequest for an heir” abrogated the former verse, whereas this can be taken as a mufassir (explainer) of the verse. It does not cancel the verse, but rather explains whom it applies to. The commentator al-Baydawi notes that the hadith and the verse do not oppose each other. Instead, the hadith provides ta‘keed (reinforcement and confirmation) to the verse. Furthermore, as the hadith is ahad (isolated narration) rather than mutawatir (widely transmitted), it lacks the strength to be a reliable narration, let alone one which abrogates a definitive Quranic injunction.[45]
Furthermore, a grammatical analysis of the bequest verse supports this reconciliation, specifically regarding the prefix lām (meaning “for” or “to”) in the phrase li-l-walidayni wa-l-aqrabin (“for the parents and near relatives”). In his treatise on the subject, Qazi Muhammad Nazir Lyallpuri, an erudite Ahmadi scholar, outlines two grammatical explanations that harmonise this verse with the law of inheritance.
First, the lam in this verse can be understood not as the lam of istighraq (which encompasses all members of a category universally), but as the lam of ‘ahd (which refers to specific, known entities). According to this interpretation, the verse refers specifically to those parents and relatives who are excluded from receiving the fixed shares of inheritance outlined in Surah an-Nisa, for example, non-Muslim parents or relatives. Since Prophet Muhammad (sa) explicitly stated that “there is no bequest for an heir,” this verse serves to instruct the believer to make a bequest specifically for these non-inheriting relatives.[46]
Additionally, Qadhi Sahib notes that the prefix can alternatively be read as the lam of ifada (indicating benefit or advantage). Under this reading, the verse translates to making a will for the benefit of the parents and relatives. In this scenario, the Quran instructs the dying person to make a clear will, detailing any debts owed or discretionary gifts given to non-heirs in the presence of their primary heirs. The ultimate “benefit” of this injunction is the protection of the family, in that it ensures that after the person passes away, no internal disputes will arise and no outsider can come forward with false claims, as mentioned earlier. Rather than contradicting the inheritance verse, the bequest verse acts as a legal shield to protect the fixed shares of the heirs.[47]
There is another benefit in both verses being operative, which can especially be applied in the modern day. In lands in which Islamic law is not state law, a believer can use the bequest verse as a legal tool to mandate that their estate be distributed according to Sharia. If we declare this verse to be abrogated, we lose a vital Quranic mechanism that allows Muslims living under different legal systems to fulfil their religious obligations.[48]
Finally, the verse specifies that the “will” in question is for those who leave behind khairan, which can mean substantial and abundant wealth according to al-Raghib al-Isfahani’s al-Mufradat and also the sayings of the Companions. If one’s wealth is limited, the fixed shares of Surah an-Nisa are sufficient. However, if one possesses maal-e-kathir (abundant wealth), they should use the “discretionary third” by way of a will to provide for those outside the inheritance law, as has been mentioned, without violating the rights of the primary heirs.[49]
The inheritance verse in Surah an-Nisa provides the mandatory skeleton of the estate’s distribution, while the bequest verse in Surah al-Baqarah ensures clarity and the flexibility to provide for unique cases. In light of this reconciliation, both verses remain operative and essential, upholding the perfect preservation of the Quran.
2. Rights of a widow: Four months and ten days or a year? (Surah al-Baqarah Ch.2: V.241 by V.235)
The second instance of perceived abrogation involves the waiting period (iddah) and financial provision (mata’) for a widow. The two verses in question are:
“And those of you who die and leave behind wives shall bequeath to their wives provision for a year without their being turned out. But if they themselves go out, there shall be no blame upon you in regard to any proper thing which they do concerning themselves. And Allah is Mighty, Wise.” (2:241)
“And those of you who die and leave wives behind, these (wives) shall wait concerning themselves four months and ten days. And when they have reached the end of their period, no sin shall lie on you in anything that they do with regard to themselves according to what is fair. And Allah is aware of what you do.” (2:235)
It has been argued that the shorter period of four months and ten days abrogated the requirement for a full year of provision from the family of the deceased (his heirs). However, upon closer inspection, these verses address two entirely different topics.
Conceptually, for abrogation to take place, the two verses must address the exact same subject (thus being in direct conflict). In this case, two separate topics are addressed and clarified.[50] Verse 235 establishes the iddah for a widow, which is a strict legal waiting period before a woman is allowed to remarry. Verse 241, however, establishes the ruling pertaining to mata‘, which is a period of provision she has been allowed, which is a moral recommendation upon the heirs of the deceased for a prescribed period of time after her husband’s death. One is a legal restriction on the woman, while the other is a favour. This is not an obligation (wajib) upon the heirs, but a recommended act of benevolence (mustahabb).
To further clarify the nature of this year-long provision, it is essential to distinguish between an obligatory legal ruling and a moral recommendation. Shah Wali Allah asserts that the phrase “there is no sin” (la junaha) in verse 241 evidences that if the widow does not leave of her own accord, it would be a sin upon the family of the deceased to stop providing the maintenance (mata‘).[51] Under this interpretation, the provision for a full year is claimed to be obligatory (wajib) upon the heirs. However, as noted by Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad (ra), this verse is better understood as a “kind exhortation” rather than a rigid legal obligation.[52]
The phrase “there is no sin” has been used in the Quran to reassure believers against a perceived sin, rather than to highlight what is otherwise a sin. A parallel is found in the command regarding the tawaf between Safa and Marwa (2:159), where the Quran similarly states there is “no sin” (la junaha) in performing it. This was revealed because such a tawaf may be considered by some in society to be an act of sin; thus, the wording was used to absolve them of a perceived sin, not to imply the act was inherently wrong.[53]
The Quran uses this phrase here because in pre-Islamic Arabia, the iddah of a widow was observed for an entire year. During this time, she was forbidden to remarry. By stating there is “no sin” if the woman chooses to leave after her legal waiting period (of four months and ten days) but before the full year elapses, the Quran protects her from the social stigma of the old custom. It clarifies that her leaving early is not a sin upon her, nor is it a sin upon the heirs if they do not stop her (from leaving). Consequently, the one-year provision remains a highly recommended act of benevolence (mustahabb) and mercy for the widow, rather than a legally binding mandate that would render the heirs sinful for her early departure. Ibn Abbas also noted that this makes the one-year provision mustahab (recommended/preferred) rather than wajib (obligatory). It is a matter of jawaz (permission) and istijab (recommendation).[54]
Islam shortened the waiting period to four months and ten days; however, as a mercy, the right to remain and be provided for a full year was granted as a blessing for the woman. If she chooses to utilise that year, perhaps due to the pain of grief or a pregnancy, as noted by Abu Muslim al-Isfahani, the family has a moral responsibility to support her. This, however, is not an obligation (wajib). As the year-long period is mustahabb and a favour in addition to her iddat right, this provision is not a part of her inheritance (which legally must be given).[55]
The context of these verses shows that the commandment regarding four months and ten days had to have already been revealed before the commandment of a year. Had that not been the case, there would be no established iddah, and she would thus be allowed to leave without sin on the first day, or anytime within the year, and able to remarry instantly without a waiting period. This is something God would not seem to allow. Since the one-year period cannot be the iddat, it must have already been revealed.[56]
The asbab al-nuzul also causes confusion here. Historical reports, including those in Bukhari from Ibn Zubair and Mujahid, suggest that the four months and ten days verse was actually revealed before the verse of the one-year provision. Logically, an abrogating verse (nasikh) cannot be revealed before the verse it is supposed to cancel (mansukh). Furthermore, in the final compilation of the Quran, the “abrogating” verse is placed before the “abrogated” one. If this were a case of abrogation, such placement would not be logical and would further the confusion.[57]
By separating the legal requirement of the waiting period from the moral recommendation of financial provision for the year, the perceived contradiction disappears. The Quran provides a legal minimum for the woman and a moral maximum for the family, ensuring the widow is both legally free and socially protected.
3. Fighting fewer enemies (Surah al-Anfal, Ch.8: V.66 with V.67)
The third instance of perceived abrogation is regarding the apparent shift in the number of enemies Muslims must face on the battlefield. The two verses in question are found in Surah al-Anfal:
“O Prophet, urge the believers to fight. If there be of you twenty who are steadfast, they shall overcome two hundred; and if there be a hundred of you, they shall overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they are a people who do not understand.” (8:66)
“For the present Allah has lightened your burden, for He knows that there is weakness in you. So, if there be a hundred of you who are steadfast, they shall overcome two hundred; and if there be a thousand of you, they shall overcome two thousand by the command of Allah. And Allah is with those who are steadfast.” (8:67)
Classical commentators generally argue that the second verse (8:67) abrogated the first (8:66), suggesting that the initial command to fight at a 1:10 ratio (20 facing 200 and 100 facing 1000) was too difficult and was therefore permanently replaced by a 1:2 ratio (100 facing 200 and 1,000 facing 2,000). However, these verses can be reconciled as representing two different “states” (halat) of the Muslim community, both of which remain legally operative depending on the context.
The purpose of both verses was to serve as encouragement for the Muslims to partake in jihad. The first verse introducing the 1:10 ratio had a dual purpose: it was not only a command but also an aspiration for the Muslims. It refers to a time of glory and majesty (shokat ka zamana) in the future, when Muslims would be fully trained, equipped and in a position to face such large numbers of enemies. To set a high sense of aspiration, Allah revealed the ideal standard of courage. The second verse (8:67) was then revealed, however, to address the condition of the Muslims at the time. Historically, in the very early days of Islam, Muslims were not seasoned fighters, as evidenced by the Battle of Badr, where they were inexperienced, ill-equipped and heavily outnumbered in comparison to the enemy.[58]
The “time of glory” referred to in the first verse did eventually manifest for the Muslims, such as in the Battle of Yarmuk, where Muslim armies faced and overcame massive forces of disbelievers, far exceeding the 1:2 ratio. The first verse remains a standard of excellence for a strong, prepared army, while the second is a protection for a weak or struggling one.
This shift can be understood through the categories of azeema (the ideal, normative position) and rukhsa (the merciful concession). As al-Nahhas records from Ibn Abbas, the second verse provides takhfif (a lightening or easing) rather than naskh (absolute cancellation). A perfect parallel can be found in the laws of fasting. While fasting is mandatory, a concession (rukhsa) is given to travellers or the sick. No jurist argues that the concession for travellers “abrogates” the general command to fast. Similarly, the 1:2 ratio is a permanent concession for a state of weakness, while the 1:10 ratio remains the operative ideal (azeema) for those with the strength and ability to meet it. Both rulings coexist in the Quranic framework to accommodate the changing realities.[59]
Linguistically, this can be viewed as a conditional command. Citing al-Khudari and Abu Muslim al-Isfahani, Lyallpuri Sahib notes that the first verse only applies if the believers possess the necessary strength and ability (istita‘a). In Arabic grammar, the response to the condition (jaza al-shart) is sometimes omitted (mahduf) but implied: “If you have twenty steadfast men [then they should fight].” Allah uses the word yukhaffifa (to lighten) to describe this shift. Just as a free man is given a concession to marry a bondwoman if he lacks the means to marry a free woman (4:26), the 1:2 ratio is a legal mercy for the disadvantaged. If a community possesses the strength to follow the higher command, it cannot claim the concession. If it lacks it, the concession is a legal right.[60]
Additionally, if abrogation was to be conceded in this case, critics could argue that if God is all-knowing as claimed by Muslims, why would He reveal such a commandment knowing full well the Muslims did not have the ability to fulfil it at the time, only to then abrogate it Himself, forever? Allah explicitly states in the Quran that He does not burden a soul beyond its capacity. Therefore, to reveal such a verse and then abrogate it does not befit the majesty of God.
This transition is a form of rukhsa (merciful concession) granted during a period when the believers’ faith was temporarily weaker. Crucially, this shift is defined as a legal commandment rather than a prophecy; it mandates that believers must not turn back even when facing opponents twice their size, as retreating in such circumstances would be sinful. While the earlier instruction required facing a 1:10 ratio, this command was limited by the later verse to accommodate the community’s immediate condition. Over time, as the Muslims witnessed divine signs and achieved greater organisation, their faith matured and strengthened, allowing them to eventually meet and even exceed the original, higher standard of courage.[61]
This historical progression is exemplified by the Battle of Yarmuk, where the Muslim force decisively defeated an enemy force that was manifold larger than it, according to historical accounts, proving that the ideal standard remained a practical reality for a strengthened and organised community.[62]
Therefore, by viewing this as a shift from the ideal standard (azeema) to a merciful concession (rukhsa and takhfif), the need for abrogation is removed. Instead of the higher standard being cancelled forever, a realistic concession for times of hardship was put in place. The higher standard remained in the Quran for when the community would possess the requisite strength, as it eventually did. Both verses remain perfectly preserved as guides for the different states a community may find itself in.
4. Marriages of the Holy Prophet (Surah al-Ahzab, Ch.33: V.53 with V.51)
This fourth instance of perceived abrogation is regarding the rulings pertaining to the marriages of the Holy Prophet (sa). The verses in Surah al-Ahzab are:
“It is not allowed to thee to marry women after that, not to change them for other wives even though their goodness please thee, except any that thy right hand possesses. And Allah is Watchful over all things.” (33:53)
“O Prophet, We have made lawful to thee thy wives whom thou hast paid their dowries, and those whom thy right hand possesses from among those whom Allah has given thee as gains of war, and the daughters of thy paternal uncle, and the daughters of thy paternal aunts, and the daughters of thy maternal uncle, and the daughters of thy maternal aunts who have emigrated with thee, and any other believing woman if she offers herself for marriage to the Prophet provided the Prophet desires to marry her; this is only for thee, as against other believers – We have already made known what We have enjoined on them concerning their wives and those whom their right hands possess – in order that there may be no difficulty for thee in the discharge of thy work. And Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful.” (33:51)
It has been argued that the verse which allowed Prophet Muhammad (sa) to marry certain categories of women (33:51), was revealed after the restrictive verse of prohibition (the nature of which will be discussed). Thus, the permissive verse, revealed after, abrogated any prohibition and restored broader permission for the Holy Prophet (sa).
The claim that the restriction (la yahillu) was revealed first is based on opinion (rai) and analogical reasoning (qias), notes Lyallpuri Sahib, as opposed to definitive historical evidence (qat‘i tarikhi thubut) to support this. Rather, there is an absence of such evidence. In the final compilation of the Quran, the verse granting permissibility has been placed first, followed by the verse pronouncing restriction. Many prominent authorities among the tabi’un – including Ubay bin Kab, Mujahid, Ikrima, Dahhak, and Qatada – maintained that the restrictive verse was actually revealed later. As recorded by Tirmidhi from Ibn Abbas, the restrictive verse served to affirm that it was prohibited to marry any woman outside the specific permissible categories.[63]
Therefore, the permissive verse was revealed first, clearly outlining the types of women the Prophet (sa) could marry. Then, in the restrictive verse, Allah affirms that anything outside of these categories was impermissible, as well as replacing his current wives.
To understand the prohibition on replacing his current wives, the historical context is important. Prior to these verses, the wives of the Prophet (sa) were given a choice mentioned in the Quran: they could either be released from the marriage contract and seek the comforts of this world, or choose Allah and His messenger and remain married to him (33:29-30). They chose the latter, displaying immense sacrifice and devotion. In response to this choice, Allah revealed the restrictive verse (33:53) as a divine mercy, thereby indicating His pleasure. It served as a favour upon the wives for this sacrifice, ensuring that the Prophet (sa) would not marry further women beyond the categories already defined, nor would he replace his existing wives with others. In this way, Allah honoured the status of the women who had chosen to stand by the Prophet (sa).[64]
Rather than contradiction, these verses refine one another. The permissive verse (33:51) explains the mashrut muthbit hukm of permissiveness – a conditional affirmation of the specific categories of women that were lawful for the Prophet (sa) to marry. The second verse (33:53) provides a clarification of the hukm of hurmat – that any women from outside these categories are categorically forbidden.[65]
It would be against the majesty and mercy of Allah to grant a reward to the wives and then immediately “abrogate” that honour by restoring a broader permission later. Which would mean the restriction is cancelled completely. Rather than one verse cancelling the other, these verses, when understood together, also represent a progression of divine law. The Quran first defined the legal categories and then, as a specific honour for the Prophet’s (sa) wives and to affirm and emphasise that anything outside those categories is forbidden without exception, restricted them.
If these verses are to be considered a case of abrogation, this would pose a significant problem regarding the nature of God. Some commentators argue that God first revealed the restrictive verses to honour the wives (acknowledge and appreciate their sacrifice), but then lifted that restriction to ease the Prophet’s (sa) burden. However, one must ask: would an All-Knowing God not be aware of such potential hardship when issuing the restriction in the first place? To grant a status of honour to the wives and then revoke it is fundamentally at odds with the Majesty of God.
This is why the chronology provided by early authorities is so vital. Since the restrictive verse was revealed after the permissive one – according to Ubayy bin Ka‘b and others – the phrase “you can take who you want and leave who you want” (33:52) in the verse between the two cannot mean the Prophet (sa) was permitted to divorce his wives at will. If the permissive verses had abrogated the restrictive ones, it would imply that God took away a reward for the sacrifice of the wives without any reason or fault on their part.[66]
When read in their correct historical order, the verses do not conflict. The permissive section (33:51) can refer to the Prophet’s (sa) discretion in deciding the order and turns among his wives, which he would rotate on a daily basis, clarifying that he had no restriction in his ordering of which wife he would visit in which order. While he could marry from the specific categories mentioned, the latter restrictive verse (33:53) meant that any women he would henceforth marry could no longer be divorced to replace them. This, as mentioned, was a lasting recognition of the initial wives’ sacrifice. Any woman who chose to marry the Prophet (sa) after this point did so with full knowledge of the worldly sacrifice required.[67]
The 19th-century commentator al-Alusi further corroborates this by noting that this sequence and chronology of revelation prove there was no abrogation. Instead, God revealed the final restriction to demonstrate the honour of the wives of the Prophet (sa) and to offer them a unique status of divine pleasure.[68] By preserving both rulings, the Quran establishes a clear progression: first defining the legal categories of marriage, and then honouring the Prophet’s (sa) household by making those bonds permanent and protected from divorce.
5. Charity before meeting the Holy Prophet (Surah al-Mujadalah, Ch.58: V.13 with V.14)
The fifth and final instance of perceived abrogation is regarding the giving of charity prior to private consultation with the Holy Prophet (sa). The two verses in question are:
“O ye who believe! when you consult the Messenger in private, give alms before your consultation. That is better for you and purer. But if you find not anything to give, then Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful.” (58:13)
“Are you afraid of giving alms before your consultation? So, when you do not do so and Allah has been merciful to you, then observe Prayer and pay the Zakat and obey Allah and His Messenger. And Allah is Well-Aware of what you do.” (58:14)
Traditional commentators almost universally label this a clear-cut case of abrogation. They argue that 58:13 imposed a mandatory commandment to give charity before the private consultation with the Prophet (sa), as people used to crowd him with questions and requests, so they had to give charity first. Then, 58:14 abrogated this requirement, as the believers found it too difficult to implement. However, we find that the theory of abrogation is unnecessary when the context and nuances are understood.
The first verse (58:13) explicitly acknowledges that this command, like others in the Quran, might be too difficult for some to implement. It states within the verse that the poor, who clearly could not afford to give, were excused: “But if you find not the means, then surely Allah is Most Forgiving, Merciful.” Because the verse already contains a built-in exception for those unable to implement it, the argument that the law had to be removed because it was too hard becomes unnecessary. The Quran had already provided an exception within the commandment itself.
Alongside this, the first verse mentions that giving alms is “better for you and purer,” but it adds a crucial exception: “if you find not the means.” This phrasing indicates that the commandment was never an obligation (wajib) like the five daily prayers. Rather, it was a highly recommended act (mustahabb) of etiquette intended to teach the believers to value the Prophet’s (sa) time and to support the poor, and in doing so, seek the pleasure and blessings of Allah.[69]
Linguistically, the terms “better for you” and “purer” (khayrun lakum wa athar) are superlative (ism tafdeel) in Arabic grammar, which are used for the highest state. This implies that while purity can be attained without charity, the act of giving increases the level of purity. Therefore, this shows the command was mandub (recommended) rather than being obligatory. Verse 14 then provides a rukhsa (merciful concession). As Lyallpuri Sahib observes, a concession does not abrogate the high standard; it simply provides a realistic option for the general community. Both remain operative: the standard of excellence for those who can meet it, and the path of mercy for those who cannot.[70]
In the second verse, a type of fear has been mentioned: “Are you afraid of giving alms […]?” It has been claimed that the Companions “feared” giving charity out of stinginess; however, this is not befitting of the Islamic understanding of the character of the Companions. Instead, their apprehension stemmed from the absence of a minimum amount tied to the word sadaqa; it was left open as to how much one should give, so as not to overburden a person. Their fear, rooted in piety, was whether they had given enough to have truly complied with God’s command. God addresses this psychological burden in verse 14 by clarifying that if they were willing to give and were simply anxious about the quantity, they were already forgiven. It affirms that God does not require from a person more than they have the capacity to give, and this “forgiveness” was intended to remove a spiritual anxiety, not to cancel a mandatory law.[71]
Abu Muslim al-Isfahani argues, as noted by Lyallpuri Sahib, that the command of giving alms was a temporary ruling (hukm mu’aqqat) designed to distinguish between true believers and hypocrites. The hypocrites at the time would not want to spend their wealth in the path of God, and from among the hypocrites, people had accepted Islam and become believers. Therefore, this was to see who would comply willingly. Once this “test of sincerity” had fulfilled its purpose, the requirement naturally expired (saqit). According to Shah Wali Allah’s own admission and principle in al-Fawz al-Kabir, the expiration of a temporary ruling does not constitute technical abrogation; it is at most an abrogation in a linguistic sense (naskh lughwi), rather than a technical abrogation (naskh istilahi).[72]
That God says in verse 14 that if you are not able to, then Allah is merciful to you, i.e. you will not be held accountable, and that God is Forgiving and Merciful, has been used to evidence that not giving charity was a sin that required abrogation. However, Lyallpuri Sahib points to a parallel in Surah al-Ahzab regarding the Prophet’s (sa) marriages. There, the words Ghafurun Rahim (He is Forgiving and Merciful) appear after a concession (rukhsa) where no sin was committed. This proves that, in Quranic terminology, such a phrase often refers to the removal of a hardship or protection against future ill effects, rather than forgiveness for a committed sin, and that such wording can follow a rukhsa (concession) or mandub (recommended) act, not only a sinful one. Thus, verse 14 serves as a tafsir (explanation) of the first verse, not its nasikh (abrogator). By applying these points of reconciliation, this perceived contradiction in Surah al-Mujadalah disappears.[73]
Conclusion
The historical evolution of the naskh theory, from its fluid and figurative use by the Companions to the tightening of definitions by scholars and inflation in the number of abrogated verses, reveals more about the development of human legal thought and interpretation than it does about the nature of the Quranic text itself. The “problem” of abrogation was largely a product of a semantic gap and the reliance on extra-Quranic literature. For there to be any sort of “change” in the ruling of a verse does not mean the verse is abrogated in the absolute sense. To have any discussion on the topic of abrogation, it is imperative that definitions are clearly defined first.
By addressing the remaining five verses that even the most rigorous reformers found challenging to reconcile, a clear pattern emerges. Perceived contradictions disappear when verses are read with the firm intention of reconciliation instead of rejection, and through the lens of situational exegesis and historical context rather than as isolated fragments. We find that the Quran does not contain “expired” or discarded parts which are no longer operational or, worse still, no longer a part of the Quran; rather, it provides a diverse set of laws where different rulings apply to the varying conditions – such as of strength, weakness or social need – that humanity faces throughout history and even today.
Bringing the count of absolute abrogation to zero resolves not only a technical debate but also restores the Muslim belief in the Quran’s perfect preservation. It affirms that the Quran today is exactly as it was intended by the All-Knowing God, Who was, and is, aware of the wisdom and purpose behind every verse that was revealed. In this light, every iota of the text remains operational, serving as an eternal guide for all people, in all times and for every situation.
Endnotes:
[1] The number of verses which can be considered abrogated in a loose sense can reach up to 500 according to Shah Wali Allah Sahib (as mentioned in al-Fawz al-Kabir), which is roughly 8% of the Quran.
[2] Ibn Salama, Abu al-Qasim Hibat Allah, al-Nasikh wa al-mansukh, 2nd edn (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1967), p. 46
[3] Fatoohi, Louay, Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 150
[4] Powers, David S., ‘The Exegetical Genre nasikh al‑Qur‘an wa mansukhuhu’, in Approaches to the History of the Interpretation of the Qur‘an, ed. by Andrew Rippin (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2013), p. 118
[5] Other interpretations exist, such as ayah referring to previous divine laws that have been replaced.
[6] Powers, nasikh al-Qur‘an, p. 118
[7] Ibid., p. 119
[8] Ibid., p. 119
[9] Ibid., p. 124
[10] Burton, John. ‘The Exegesis of q. 2:106 and the Islamic Theories of naskh: mā nansakh min āya aw nansahā naʾti bi khairin minhā aw mithlihā’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 483 (1985), pp. 452-69; Powers, nasikh al-Qur‘an, p. 125; Martin Nguyen, ‘Sunni Hermeneutical Literature’, in Oxford Handbook of Quranic Studies, ed. by Mustafa Shah and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, p. 839; Fatoohi, Abrogation in the Quran.
[11] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, Iʻlam al-Muwaqqiʻin ʿan Rabb al-ʿAlamin (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1991), Vol. 1, p. 29. Referenced in Justin Parrott, “Abrogated Rulings in the Qur’an: Discerning Their Divine Wisdom”, yaqeeninstitute.org, 27 December 2023
[12] Shah Wali Allah, al-Fawz al-Kabir (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwah, 1986), p. 83
[13] Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 13
[14] “Abrogated Rulings in the Qur‘an: Discerning their Divine Wisdom”, yaqeeninstitute.org, 27 December 2023
[15] Ibn ’Aqīlah, Al-Ziyādah wa al-Ihsān fī ’Ulūm al-Qur’ān (al-Shāriqah: Markaz al-Buḥūth wal-Dirāsāt al-Shāriqah, 2008), Vol. 5, p. 298. Referenced in Justin Parrott, “Abrogated Rulings in the Qur’an: Discerning Their Divine Wisdom”, yaqeeninstitute.org, 27 December 2023
[16] al-Shāṭibī, Al-Muwāfaqāt (Cairo: Dār Ibn ‘Affān, 1997), Vol. 3, p. 346; al-Sakhāwī, Jamāl al-Qurrā’ wa Kamāl al-Iqrā’ (Beirut: Mu’ssasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfīyah, 1999), Vol. 2, p. 589; al-Qurṭubī, Jāmiʻ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’an (Cairo: Dār al-Kutūb al-Miṣrīyah, 1964) Vol 2, p. 65, verse 2:106; all referenced in Justin Parrott, “Abrogated Rulings in the Qur’an: Discerning Their Divine Wisdom”, yaqeeninstitute.org, 27 December 2023
[17] Powers, nasikh al-Qur‘an, p. 122
[18] Ibid., p. 122
[19] Ibid., p. 122. This important distinction between naskh usuli and naskh tafsiri was made by Al-Fadali, the modern editor of Ibn al-Ata‘iqi.
[20] Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 9, 93
[21] Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 56; Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 93
[22] Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 93
[23] Ibn Salama, al-Nasikh wa al-mansukh, p. 46.
[24] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Irshadat-e-Noor, Vol. 1, p. 15
[25] Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 93
[26] Burton, Theories of Abrogation, p. 198; Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 93
[27] Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith 4091
[28] Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal ed. by Shu‘aib al-Arna’ūt et al., 50 vols, Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1995–2001, Vol. 5, Hadith 3501, p. 451.
[29] Sahih Muslim, Hadith 1452a
[30] Fatoohi, Abrogation, p. 148
[31] Ibid., p. 150
[32] Ibid., p. 154
[33] Ibid., p. 152
[34] Ibid., p. 206
[35] Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Izala-e-Auham, Ruhani Khazain, Vol. 3, p. 170
[36] Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Al Haqq Mubahitha Ludhiana, Ruhani Khazain, Vol. 4, p. 93
[37] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Haqaiq al-Furqan, Vol. 1, p. 300
[38] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Irshadat-e-Noor, Vol. 1, pp. 14-16
[39] Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Tafsir-e-Kabir, Vol. 2, pp. 363-364
[40] Ibid., p. 363
[41] Shah Wali Allah, al-Fawz al-Kabir (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwah, 1986), p. 93
[42] Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Tafsir-e-Kabir, Vol. 3, pp. 153-156
[43] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Haqaiq al-Furqan, Vol. 1, p. 299; Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Tafsir-e-Kabir, Vol. 3, pp. 153-156
[44] Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Tafsir-e-Kabir, Vol. 3, pp. 153-156
[45] Qadi Muhammad Nadhir Lyallpuri, La Naskh fi al-Quran: Quran Majeed Mein Koi Ayat Mansukh Nahin, in al-Furqan, ed. By Abul Ata Jalandhari, January 1958, pp. 21-22
[46] Ibid., 23
[47] Ibid., 24
[48] Ibid., 24
[49] Ibid., 25
[50] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Haqaiq al-Furqan, Vol. 1, p. 375
[51] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, p. 28
[52] Five Volume Commentary, Under Ch.2: V.241
[53] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, p. 28
[54] Ibid., pp. 27-28
[55] Ibid., p. 31
[56] Ibid., pp. 29-30
[57] Ibid., pp. 29-31
[58] Malik Ghulam Farid, The Holy Qur’an Arabic Text with English Translation and Short Commentary, under Ch.8: V.67; Lyallpuri, La Naskh, pp. 34-38
[59] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, pp. 34-38
[60] Ibid., p. 36
[61] Five Volume Commentary, Under Ch.8: V.67
[62] Ibid.
[63] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Haqaiq al-Furqan, Vol. 4, p. 457; Lyallpuri, La Naskh, p. 39
[64] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, pp. 38-51
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Hazrat Hakeem Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, Haqaiq al-Furqan, Vol. 5, p. 268
[70] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, pp. 51-62
[71] Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Tafsir Saghir, under Ch.58: V.14
[72] Lyallpuri, La Naskh, pp. 51-62
[73] Ibid.